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Dynamic choice under ambiguity
Marciano Siniscalchi
Department of Economics, Northwestern University
This paper analyzes dynamic choice for decision makers whose preferences vio-
late Savage’s sure-thing principle (Savage 1954) and, therefore, give rise to viola-
tions of dynamic consistency. The consistent-planning approach introduced by
Strotz (1955–1956) provides one way to deal with dynamic inconsistencies; how-
ever, consistent planning is typically interpreted as a solution concept for a game
played by “multiple selves” of the same individual.
The main result of this paper shows that consistent planning underuncertainty
is fully characterized by suitable behavioral assumptions on the individual’s pref-
erences over decision trees. In particular, knowledge of ex ante preferences over
trees is sufﬁcient to characterize the behavior of a consistent planner. The results
thus enable a fully decision-theoretic analysis of dynamic choice with dynami-
cally inconsistent preferences.
The analysis accommodates arbitrary decision models and updating rules; in
particular, no restriction needs to be imposed on risk attitudes and sensitivity to
ambiguity.
Keywords. Ambiguity, consistent planing, value of information.
JEL classification. D81, D83.
1. Introduction
In a dynamic-choice problem under uncertainty, a decision maker (DM henceforth) ac-
quires information gradually over time, and takes actions in multiple periods and in-
formation scenarios. The basic formulation of expected utility (EU) theory instead con-
cerns a reduced-form, atemporal environment, wherein preferences are deﬁned over
maps from a state space   to a set of prizes X (acts). Thus, to analyze dynamic-choice
problems, it is necessary to augment the atemporal EU theory with assumptions about
the individual’s preferences at different decision points. The standard assumption is
of course Bayesian updating: if the individual’s initial beliefs are characterized by the
probability q, her beliefs at any subsequent decision point h a r eg i v e nb yt h ec o n d i -
tional probability q(·|B),w h e r et h ee v e n tB represents the information available to the
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individual at h. Together with the assumption that the individual’s risk preferences do
not change, Bayesian updating ensures that the DM’s behavior satisﬁes a crucial prop-
erty, dynamic consistency (DC): the course of action that the individual deems optimal
at a given decision point h, on the basis of the preferences she holds at h,i sa l s oo p t i m a l
when evaluated from the perspective of any earlier decision point h  (and conversely, if
h is reached with positive probability starting from h ). This implies in particular that
backward induction or dynamic programming can be applied to identify optimal plans
of action.
Bayesian updating and the DC property are intimately related to the cornerstone of
Savage’s axiomatization of EU, namely his Postulate P2; Section 2 discusses this tight
connection and provides references. Sensitivity to ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961), or to the
common-ratio or common consequence effects (Allais 1953, Starmer 2000) and other
manifestations of non-EU risk attitudes typically leads to violations of Savage’s Postu-
late P2. As a consequence, violations of DC are to be expected when such preferences
are employed to analyze dynamic-choice problems; again, Section 2 elaborates on this
point and provides illustrative examples. These violations of DC, and ways to address
them, are the focus of the present paper.
Whenever a conﬂict arises among preferences at different decision points, addi-
tional assumptions are required to make clear-cut behavioral predictions (Epstein and
Schneider 2003, p. 7). One approach, introduced by Strotz (1955–1956)i nt h ec o n t e x t
of deterministic choice with changing time preferences and tastes, is to assume that the
DM adopts the strategy of consistent planning (CP). In Strotz’s own words, at every de-
cision point, a consistent planner chooses “the best plan among those that [s]he will
actually follow” (Strotz 1955–1956, p. 173).
Formally, CP is a reﬁnement of backward induction that incorporates a speciﬁc tie-
breaking rule. Informally, CP reﬂects the intuitive notion that the DM is sophisticated:
that is, she holds correct “beliefs” about her own future choices. The problem with this
intuitive notion is that, of course, beliefs about future choices cannot be observed di-
rectly; they also cannot be elicited on the basis of the DM’s initial and/or conditional
preferences over acts.
The literature on time-inconsistent preferences circumvents this difﬁculty by sug-
gesting that CP is best viewed as a solution concept for a game played by “multiple
selves” of the same individual. Strotz himself (Strotz 1955–1956, p. 179) explicitly writes
that “[t]he individual over time is an inﬁnity of individuals”; see also Karni and Safra
(1990, pp. 392–393),O’DonoghueandRabin(1999,p.106),andPiccioneandRubinstein
(1997, p. 17). However, at the very least, this interpretation represents “a major depar-
ture from the standard economics conception of the individual as the unit of agency”
(Gul and Pesendorfer 2008, p. 30). It certainly does not clarify what it means for an in-
dividual decision maker to adopt the strategy of consistent planning. It reinforces the
perception that a sound, behavioral analysis of multiperiod choice requires some form
of dynamic consistency (Epstein and Schneider 2003, p. 2). Finally, it provides very little
guidance with regard to policy analysis.
ThispaperaddressestheseissuesbyprovidingafullybehavioralanalysisofCPinthe
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initiated by Kreps (1979), I assume that the individual is characterized by a single, ex
antepreferencerelationoverdynamicchoiceproblems,modeledasdecisiontrees. Ithen
show the following conditions.
• Under suitable assumptions, conditional preferences can be derived from ex ante
preferences over trees, regardless of whether preferences over acts satisfy Savage’s
Postulate P2 (see Section 4.2 and Theorem 1).
• Sophistication can be formalized as a behavioral axiom on preferences over trees,
regardless of whether DC holds (see Section 4.3.2).
• The proposed sophistication axiom, plus auxiliary assumptions, provides a be-
havioral rationale for CP (Theorems 2 and 3), again regardless of whether P2 or
DC holds.
Three features of the analysis in this paper deserve special emphasis. First, the ap-
proach in this paper is fully behavioral in the speciﬁc sense that the implications of
CP are entirely reﬂected in the individual’s ex ante preferences over trees, which are
observable.
Second,byprovidingaformaldeﬁnitionofsophisticationthatdoesnotinvolvemul-
tiple selves, this paper provides a way to interpret this intuitive notion as a behavioral
principle—butonethatappliestopreferencesovertrees,ratherthanoveracts. Theanal-
ysis also indicates that seemingly minor differences in the way sophistication is formal-
ized can have signiﬁcant consequences in the context of choice under uncertainty; see
Section 5.2.
Third, minimal assumptions are required on preferences over acts: the substan-
tive requirements considered in this paper are imposed on preferences over trees. In
particular, Postulate P2 and hence DC play no role in the analysis. This allows for
prior and conditional preferences that exhibit a broad range of attitude toward risk and
ambiguity—a main objective of the present paper.
The main results in this paper do not restrict attention to any speciﬁc model of
choice or “updating rule.” However, to exemplify the approach taken here, Theorem 4
specializesTheorem2tothecaseofmultiple-priorspreferences(GilboaandSchmeidler
1989) and prior-by-prior updating. Furthermore, Section 4.4.2 leverages the framework
and results in this paper to address what is often cited as a “paradoxical” implication of
CP (e.g., Machina 1989, Epstein and Le Breton 1993): a time-inconsistent, but sophisti-
cated DM may forego freely available information, if by doing so she also limits her fu-
ture options. The analysis in Section 4.4.2 shows that this behavior actually has a simple
rationalization if preferences over trees, rather than just acts, are taken into account.
Organization of the paper
Section 2 illustrates the key issues by means of examples. Section 3 introduces the re-
quired notation and terminology. Section 4 presents the main results, the special case
of multiple-priors preferences, and the application to value-of-information problems.
Section 5 discusses the main results. Section 6 discusses the important connections382 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Figure 1. A dynamic decision problem; x ∈{ 0 1}.
with the existing, rich literature on dynamic choice under ambiguity, as well as work
on menu choice, intertemporal choice with changing tastes, and dynamic choice with
nonexpected utility preferences.
2. Heuristic treatment
Savage’s P2 and DC
The above assertion is that Bayesian updating and DC are intimately related to Sav-
age’s Postulate P2; this implies that failures of DC are not pathological, but rather the
norm, when non-EU preferences are employed to analyze problems of choice under
uncertainty. Savage himself provides an argument along these lines in Savage (1954,
Section 2.7); Ghirardato (2002) formally establishes the equivalence of DC and Bayesian
updatingwithP2,undersuitableancillaryassumptions. Proposition1inthepresentpa-
per provides a corresponding, slightly more general equivalenceresult in the framework
adopted here.1 These results can be illustrated in simple examples that are also useful
to describe the proposed behavioral approach to CP .
Example. An urn contains 90 amber, blue, and green balls; in the following discussion,
I consider different assumptions about what the DM knows regarding its composition.
A single ball is drawn; denote the corresponding state space by   ={ α β γ},i nt h eo b -
vious notation. At time 0, without knowing the prevailing state, the DM can choose a
“safe” action s that yields a prize of 1
2 if the ball is amber or blue, and x ∈{ 0 1} other-
wise. Alternatively, the DM can choose to place a contingent bet c.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eD M
receives x if the ball is green, and can place a bet on amber (a) or blue (b) at time 1 oth-
erwise. The situation is depicted in Figure 1: solid circles denote decision points and
empty circles denote points where Nature moves, or more properly reveals information
to the DM.
Given the state space   and prize space X ={ 0  1
2 1}, the atemporal choice envi-
roment corresponding to the decision problem under consideration consists of all acts
1All versions of this argument incorporate the assumptions of consequentialism and (with the exception
of Proposition 1 in this paper) reduction; the discussion of these substantive hypotheses is deferred until
Section 3.3.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 383
(functions) h ∈ X . Suppose ﬁrst that the DM knows the composition of the urn and
that she has risk-neutral EU preferences; her beliefs q ∈  ( ) reﬂect the composition
of the urn. Thus, in the atemporal setting, the DM evaluates acts h = (hα hβ hγ) ∈ X 
according to the functional V( h )= Eq[h].
Now, as described above, augment this basic preference speciﬁcation by assuming
that the DM updates her beliefs q in the usual way. At the second decision node, she
then conditionally (weakly) prefers a to b if and only if q({α}|{α β}) ≥ q({β}|{α β}).T h i s
is of course equivalent to q({α}) ≥ q({β}), which is the restriction on ex ante belief that
ensures that, from the point of view of the initial node, the course of action “c then a”
is weakly preferred to “c then b”. This is an instance of DC: the ex ante and conditional
rankings of the actions a and b coincide. In turn, this provides a rationale for the use of
backward induction: the plans of action available to the DM at the ﬁrst decision node
are “c then a”, “c then b”, and “s”, but one of the two c plans can be eliminated by ﬁrst
solving the choice problem at the second node. A simple calculation then shows that
“s” is never strictly preferred, regardless of the ratio of blue versus green balls. Hence,
for instance, if q({a})>q( {b}),t h e n“ c then a” is the unique optimal plan.2
To provide a concrete illustration of the relationship between DC and P2, recall that
theassumptionsofexanteEUpreferencesandBayesianupdatingdeliveredtwoconclu-
sions: (i) the ranking of a versus b at the second decision is the same as the ranking of “c
then a”v e r s u s“c then b” at the ﬁrst decision node; furthermore, (ii) the ranking of a ver-
sus b at the second node is independent of the value of x. Now assume that the modeler
does not know that ex-ante preferences conform to EU or that conditional preferences
are derived by Bayesian updating; however, he does know that (i) and (ii) hold. Clearly,
the modeler is still able to conclude that the ranking of “c then a”a n d“ c then b”m u s t
also be independent of x,s ot h a t
(1 0 0)  (0 1 0) ⇔ (1 0 1)  (0 1 1)  (1)
where  denotes the DM’s preferences over acts. This is an implication of Savage’s Pos-
tulate P2 (cf. Savage 1954, p. 23, or Axiom 2 in Section 4.1 below). In other words, as
claimed, (1)i sa l s oanecessary condition for dynamic consistency in Figure 1.
Ambiguity, DC, and CP
I now describe ambiguity-sensitive preferences that violate P2, and hence yield a fail-
ure of DC; see below for an analogous example based on the common-consequence
effect. Assume that, as in the three-color-urn version of the Ellsberg paradox Ellsberg
(1961), the DM is told only that the urn contains 30 amber balls. Assume that she ini-
tially holds multiple-priors (also known as maxmin-expected utility (MEU)) preferences
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989), is risk-neutral for simplicity, and updates her beliefs
2As per footnote 1, this argument incorporates the substantive assumptions of consequentialism and
reduction (see Section 3.3). In the tree of Figure 1, the relevant aspect of consequentialism is the fact that
the ranking of a versus b at the second decision node is independent of the value of x. Reduction instead
implies that the choice of c followed by, say, a is evaluated by applying the functional V( ·) to the associated
mapping from states to prizes, i.e., (1 0 x). I maintain both assumptions in this Introduction; the formal
results in the body of the paper allow for arbitrary departures from reduction.384 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Figure 2. A dynamic Allais-type problem; x ∈{ 0 1M}.
prior-by-prior (e.g., Jaffray 1994, Pires 2002) on learning that the ball drawn is not green.
Formally, herpreferencesoveracts h ∈ R , conditionaloneither F =   or F ={ α β},a r e
given by VF(h) = minq∈C Eq[h|F],w h e r eC is the set of all probabilities q on   such that
q({α}) = 1
3. Notice that such conditional preferences are independent of the value of x,
as is the case for Bayesian updates of EU preferences.
Note ﬁrst that, a priori (i.e., conditional on F =  ), this DM exhibits the modal pref-
erences reported by Ellsberg (1961): she prefers a bet on amber to a bet on blue, but she
also prefers betting on blue or green rather than amber or green. Therefore, the DM’s
preferences violate (1) and hence Savage’s Postulate P2. Furthermore, conditional on
{α β},t h i sD Mp r e f e r s(1 0 x)to (0 1 x)regardless of the value of x, and hence strictly
prefers a to b.
Ifnowx = 1,DCisviolated: attheﬁrstdecisionnode,theDMstrictlypreferstheplan
“c followed by b”t o“ c followed by a”, but at the second node, she strictly prefers a to b.
To resolve these inconsistencies, suppose that the DM adopts CP . The intuitive as-
sumption of sophistication implies that, at the ﬁrst decision node, the DM correctly an-
ticipates her future choice of a, regardless of the value of x. This is true despite the fact
that, for x = 1,s h er e a l l yp r e f e r st oc o m m i tt oc h o o s i n gb instead. Hence, when con-
templating the choices c and s at the ﬁrst decision node, the DM understands that she
is really comparing the plan “c then a”t o“ s”. For x = 0, she strictly prefers the former,
but, for x = 1, she strictly prefers the latter. This logic thus delivers unambiguous and
coherent behavioral predictions.
A dynamic “common consequence” paradox (cf. Allais (1953))
Violations of DC can also arise when preferences are probabilistically sophisticated but
notEU;again, CPprovidesawaytodealwiththem. Supposethatoneballistobedrawn
from an urn containing 100 balls, numbered 1–100. Figure 2 depicts the choice problem
and the payoffs, where M denotes one million (dollars), and 1     11, 12     100,a n d
so forth refer to the number on the ball drawn.
The DM’s beliefs are uniform on   ={ 1     100} at the initial node and are deter-
mined via Bayes’ rule at the second; her preferences are of the rank-dependent EU form
(Quiggin 1982), with quadratic distortion function. If x = 1M,t h ep l a n“ c followed by b”Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 385
is preferred to “c followed by a”, whereas the opposite holds if x = 0: this corresponds to
the usual violations of the independence axiom and hence of P2. Furthermore, the DM
strictly prefers a to b at the second decision node if x = 1M, so preferences are dynam-
ically inconsistent. Nevertheless, CP again delivers well deﬁned behavioral predictions:
if x = 1M, the DM correctly anticipates choosing a at the second node, and hence, by a
simple calculation, opts for s at the initial node.
Karni and Safra (1989, 1990) illustrate applications of CP with non-EU preferences
under risk.
Behavioral analysis of CP
As noted in the Introduction, this paper provides a fully behavioral analysis of CP . To il-
lustrate the key ingredients of the analysis, refer back to the decision tree in Figure 1 and
adopt a simpliﬁed version of the notation to be introduced in Section 3 (an analogous
treatment can be provided for the tree in Figure 2). Denote the original tree in Figure 1
by fx; also denote by cx and sx the subtrees of fx,w h e r ec or, respectively, s is the only
action available at the initial node. Finally, denote by cax,a n dcbx the subtrees of cx
where a or, respectively, b is the only action available at the second decision node; note
that sx, cax,a n dcbx can be interpreted as fully speciﬁed plans of action. Assume that, at
time 0, the DM expresses the following strict preferences ( ) and indifferences (∼) over
decision trees:
ca0 ∼ c0 ∼ f0   s0   cb0 and cb1   f1 ∼ s1   ca1 ∼ c1  (2)
The preferences in (2) exhibit two key features. First, preferences over plans are con-
sistentwithactpreferencesintheEllsbergparadoxand,moregenerally,withtheassumed
MEU preferences at the initial node. Speciﬁcally, ca0   s0   cb0 and ca1 ≺ s1 ≺ cb1 corre-
spondtotheDM’srankingoftheacts (1 0 x), (0 1 x),an d(1
2  1
2 x)for x = 0 1 provided
by the MEU utility index V .
The remaining preference rankings involve nondegenerate trees and do not merely
follow from the assumption of MEU preferences (even if augmented with prior-by-prior
updating); rather, they reﬂect the intuition behind sophistication that is the focus of this
paper. In particular, the indifference c1 ∼ ca1 indicates that the DM does not value the
option to choose b at time 1, when a is also available. This is not because she dislikes
action b from the perspective of time 0: on the contrary, the ranking cb1   ca1 suggests
that she prefers to commit to choosing b at time 1. Therefore, it must be the case that
this DM correctly anticipates her future strict preference for a over b,a n de v a l u a t e st h e
tree c1 accordingly.
I emphasize that this argument relies crucially on the rankings of nondegenerate
trees—e.g., c1 ∼ ca1 in (2). Indeed, this pattern of preferences constitutes the behav-
ioraldeﬁnitionofsophisticationinSection4.3.2. Moregenerally,theproposedapproach
leverages preferences, over trees to elicit conditional preferences, and analyze sophisti-
cation and related behavioral traits, just as the literature on menu choice leverages pref-386 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
erences over menus to investigate attitudes toward ﬂexibility or commitment, as well as
temptation and self-control (see Section 6).3
The preferences in (2) indicate how this particular DM resolves the conﬂict between
her prior and posterior preferences. Furthermore, the rankings f0 ∼ ca0 and f1 ∼ s can
be intepreted as the behavioral implications of sophistication: if x = 0, the DM chooses
c and plans to follow with a;i fx = 1, she chooses s instead—as predicted by CP .
The preceding argument is that if the DM is assumed to strictly prefer a to b at the
second decision node, then the prior preferences in (2) reveal that she is sophisticated.
But by reversing one’s perspective, the following interpretation is equally legitimate: if
the DM is assumed to be sophisticated, then the prior preferences in (2) reveal her rank-
ing of a versus b at the second decision node. To elaborate, as noted above, the rankings
cb1   ca1 ∼ c1 suggest that the DM expects to choose a rather than b at the second de-
cision node; if the DM is assumed to be sophisticated, this expectation must be correct,
so she must actually prefer a to b at that node. In this respect, the DM’s prior preference
relation  over trees, partially described in (2), provides all the information required to
analyze behavior in this example.
Details
Certain subtle aspects of CP in the context of choice under uncertainty require further
analysis and are fully dealt with in the remainder of this paper. First, eliciting condi-
tional preferences in general trees requires a more reﬁned approach than the one just
described; the details are provided in Section 4.2. Note that only a weak form of sophis-
tication is required.
Second, ties must be handled with care. The sophistication axiom in Section 4.3.2
is purposely formulated so as to entail no restrictions in case multiple optimal actions
exist at a node. Instead, a separate axiom captures the tie-breaking assumption that
characterizes CP .
Third, this “division of labor” is essential in the setting of choice under uncertainty.
Section 5.2 shows that under solvability conditions that are satisﬁed by virtually all
known parametric models of non-EU preferences, strengthening the sophistication ax-
iom so as to deal with ties as well has an undesirable side effect: it imposes a version of
P2 on preferences over acts, and hence, for instance, rules out the modal preferences in
the Ellsberg example.
3. Decision setting
Due to the approach taken in this paper, the notation for decision trees must serve two
purposes. First, it must provide a rigorous description of the dynamic-choice problem;
second, it must allow a precise, yet relatively straightforward, formalization of “tree-
surgery” operations—pruning actions at a given node, replacing actions at a node with
3Although I assumed that reduction holds in this speciﬁc example, the notation and formal setup allow
the DM to strictly rank two plans p and p  that can be reduced to the same act.T h i si so r t h o g o n a lt ot h e
issue of sophistication; imposing reduction throughout neither simpliﬁes nor hampers the analysis. See
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different ones, and more generally “composing” new trees out of old ones. The pro-
posed description of decision trees is relatively familiar4; however, formally describing
tree-surgery operations requires a level of detail that is not needed in other treatments
of dynamic choice under uncertainty.
For simplicity, attention is restricted to ﬁnite trees associated with a single, ﬁxed se-
quence of information partitions; see Section 5.3 for possible extensions.
3.1 Actions, trees, and histories
Fix a state space  , endowed with an algebra  , and a connected and separable space
X of outcomes. Information is modeled as a sequence of progressively ﬁner partitions
F0     FT of   for some 0 ≤ T<∞,s u c ht h a tF0 ={  } and Ft ⊂   for all t = 1     T
(sometimes referred to as a ﬁltration). For every t = 0     T, the cell of the partition Ft
containing the state ω ∈   is denoted by Ft(ω);a l s o ,ap a i r(t ω),w h e r et ∈{ 0     T}
and ω ∈  , is referred to as a node.
Trees and actions can now be deﬁned recursively as menus of contingent menus of
contingent menus   . A bit more rigorously, deﬁne ﬁrst a “tree” beginning at the termi-
nal date T in state ω simply as an outcome x ∈ X. Inductively, deﬁne an action available
in node (t ω) as a map associating with each state ω  ∈ Ft(ω) a continuation tree be-
ginning at node (t + 1 ω ); to complete the inductive step, deﬁne a tree beginning at
node (t ω) as a ﬁnite collection or menus of actions available at (t ω). The details are
as follows.
Definition 1. Let FT(ω) = FT = X for all ω ∈  . Inductively, for t = T − 1     0 and
ω ∈  , deﬁne the following terms.
(i) Let At(ω) be the set of Ft+1-measurable functions a:Ft(ω) → Ft+1 such that for
all ω  ∈ Ft+1(ω), a(ω ) ∈ Ft+1(ω ).
(ii) Let Ft(ω) be the collection of nonempty, ﬁnite subsets of At(ω).
(iii) Let Ft =

ω∈ Ft(ω).
The elements of At(ω) and Ft are called actions and trees, respectively.
Observe that the maps ω → At(ω) and ω → Ft(ω) are Ft-measurable.
Atreeisinterpretedthroughoutasanexhaustivedescriptionofthechoicesavailable
in a given decision problem; in particular, if two or more actions are available at a node,
the individual cannot also randomize among them. Of course, randomization can be
explicitly modeled by suitably extending the state space and the description of the tree.
A history describes a possible path connecting two nodes in a tree: speciﬁcally, it
indicates the actions taken and the events observed along the path. Given the ﬁltration
F0     FT, the sequence of events observed is fully determined by the prevailing state
4Epstein (2006)andEpstein et al. (2008)adoptasimilarnotationfordecisiontrees,althoughtheyarenot
motivated by (and do not deﬁne) tree-surgery operations. In the context of risk, the notation in Section 3 of
Kreps and Porteus (1978) is similar, again except for tree surgery; see Section 6 for further details.388 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
of nature; thus, formally, a history is identiﬁed by the initial time t, the prevailing state
ω, and the (possibly empty) sequence of actions taken. The details, and some related
notation and terminology, are described as follows.
Definition 2. Ahistory starting at a node (t ω) is a tuple h =[ t ω a], where either of
the following equalities holds.
• a = (at     aτ),w i t ht ≤ τ ≤ T − 1, at ∈ At(ω),a n d ,f o ra l l¯ t = t + 1     τ,
a¯ t ∈ a¯ t−1(ω).
• a = ∅ (an empty list).
The cardinality of a is denoted |a|. Furthermore: make the following deﬁnitions.
(i) If h =[ t ω a], a = ∅,a n dat ∈ At(ω),t h e na ∪ at = (at), and if a = (at     aτ),
τ<T−1,a n daτ+1 ∈ aτ(ω),t h e na∪aτ+1 ≡ (at     aτ aτ+1).
(ii) A history [t ω a] is terminal if and only if t +| a|=T and is initial if and only if
a = ∅.
(iii) A history h =[ t  ω  a] is consistent with a tree f ∈ Ft(ω) if t  = t, ω  ∈ Ft(ω),a n d
eithera = ∅ortheﬁrstactioninaisanelementoff;inthiscase ,thecontinuation
tree of f starting at h is f(h)= f if a = ∅ and is f(h)= aτ(ω ) if a = (at     aτ).
Certain special trees play an important role in the analysis. First, a plan is a tree
where a single action is available at every decision point. Formally, a tree f ∈ Ft is a plan
if, for every history h =[ t ω a] consistent with f, |f(h)|=1. The set of plans in Ft and




t (ω), respectively. Second, a constant plan yields the
same outcome in every state of the world. Formally, fx
t ω ∈ Ft(ω) is the unique plan such
that, for every terminal history h consistent with fx
t ω, fx
t ω(h) = x. If the node (t ω) can
be understood from the context, the plan fx
t ω is denoted simply by x.
As an example, the tree in Figure 1, as well as its subtrees, can be formally deﬁned
as follows (recall that a simpliﬁed notation is used in the Introduction). Let T = 2, F1 =
{{α β} {γ}},a n dF2 ={ { α} {β} {γ}}. The two choices available at the second decision
node in Figure 1 correspond to the time-1 actions a b ∈ A1(α) = A1(β) deﬁned by
a(α) = 1 a ( β ) = 0 and b(α) = 0 b ( β ) = 1  (3)
Next, deﬁne the time-0 actions cx sx cax cbx ∈ A0(α) = A0(β) = A0(γ) by, for ω = α β,
cx(ω) ={ a b} s x(ω) = 1
2  cax(ω) ={ a}  cbx(ω) ={ b} (4)
cx(γ) = sx(γ) = cax(γ) = cbx(γ) = x  (5)
Here, x and 1
2 denote the constant plans fx




NowthefulltreeinFigure1isformallydeﬁnedas fx ≡{ cx sx}, thesubtreebeginning
with the choice of c (respectively, s)i s{cx} (respectively, {sx}), and the plans correspond-
ing to the choice of c at the initial node, followed by a (respectively, b) at the second de-
cision node are {cax} and {cbx}. Finally, there are three nonterminal histories consistent
with fx: ∅, [0 α cx],a n d[0 β cx].Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 389
3.2 Composite trees
Fix f ∈ Ft, a history h =[ t ω a] consistent with f, and another tree g ∈ Ft+|a|(ω).T h e
compositetree ghf is,intuitively,atreethatcoincideswithf everywhereexceptathistory
h, where it coincides with g. Formalizing this notion is somewhat delicate, so I ﬁrst
provide some heuristics.
Sinceh =[ t ω a]isconsistentwithf anda = (at     aτ),withτ ≥ t,thelastelement
aτ of the action list a satisﬁes aτ(ω ) = f(h)for all ω  ∈ Fτ+1(ω). To capture the idea that
f(h)is replaced with g, one prefers to replace aτ in the list a with a new action ¯ aτ such
that ¯ aτ(ω ) = g at such states and ¯ aτ(ω ) = aτ(ω ) elsewhere. However, recall that, by
deﬁnition, aτ−1(ω ) must contain aτ for all ω  ∈ Fτ(ω);i faτ is replaced with ¯ aτ,i ti sa l s o
necessaryto“modify”aτ−1 sothatitnowcontains ¯ aτ ratherthanaτ insuchstates. These
modiﬁcationsmustbecarriedoutinductivelyforallactionsaτ−1 aτ−2     at;thisyields
a new, well deﬁned action list ¯ a = (¯ at     ¯ aτ). Finally, recall that, by deﬁnition, the his-
tory h =[ t ω a] is consistent with f precisely when the ﬁrst action at in the list a is an
element of f (trees are sets of actions). Then the tree ghf differs from f precisely in that
the action at is replaced with ¯ at.
Now for the formal details. If a = ∅,t h e nl e tghf ≡ g. Otherwise, write a =
(at     aτ),w i t hτ ≥ t;l e t¯ aτ(ω ) = g for all ω  ∈ Fτ+1(ω),a n dl e t¯ aτ(ω ) = aτ(ω ) for
ω  ∈ Fτ(ω)\Fτ+1(ω). Inductively, for ¯ t = τ−1     t,l e t¯ a¯ t(ω ) ={¯ a¯ t+1}∪(a¯ t(ω )\{a¯ t+1})
for all ω  ∈ F¯ t+1(ω) and let ¯ a¯ t(ω ) = a¯ t(ω ) for ω  ∈ F¯ t(ω) \ F¯ t+1(ω). Finally, let ghf de-
note the set {¯ at}∪(f \{at}).
As a special case, consider a node (t ω) and a plan f ∈ F
p
0 . Since, by deﬁnition, a
single action is available in f at any node, there is a unique history consistent with f
that corresponds to the node (t ω); it is then possible to deﬁne a tree that, informally,
coincides with f everywhere except at time t,i nc a s ee v e n tFt(ω) occurs. Such a tree is
denoted gt ωf.
Formally, since f is a t-period plan, there is a unique action list a = (a0     at−1)
such that h =[ 0 ω a] is consistent with f. Then, for all g ∈ Ft(ω),l e tgt ωf ≡ ghf.5 The
notation gt ωf is modeled after gEf, which is often used to indicate composite Savage
acts.
3.3 Preferences, reduction, and consequentialism
Definition 3. A conditional preference system (CPS) is a tuple (t ω)0≤t<T ω∈ ,s u c h
that, for every t and ω, t ω is a binary relation on Ft(ω) and, furthermore, ω  ∈ Ft(ω)
implies t ω=t ω . The time-0 preference is also denoted simply by .
Three aspects are worth emphasizing. First, preferences are assumed to be “adapted
to F”: for each t = 0     T − 1, t ω is measurable with respect to Ft. This reﬂects the
assumption that t ω is the DM’s ranking of trees conditional on observing the event
Ft(ω) at time t.
5List a is also the unique list such that, for any ω  ∈ Ft(ω), the history h =[ 0 ω  a] is consistent with
f; furthermore, the deﬁnition of composite trees implies that ghf = gh f, consistently with the intended
interpretation of gt ωf.390 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Second, recallthat, intheIntroduction, preferences over plans areimplicitlydeﬁned
by ﬁrst “reducing” plans to acts in the obvious way and then invoking the DM’s prefer-
ences over acts, represented by the functional V . While this is the “textbook” approach
to dynamic choice with EU preferences, there are compelling reasons to consider alter-
natives. For instance, the DM may display a preference for early or late resolution of the
uncertainty, as in Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989), Segal (1990), and, in
a fully subjective setting, Klibanoff and Ozdenoren (2007). To allow for such preference
models, reduction is not assumed in the main results of this paper, Theorems 1 and 2.
The proposed approach takes the DM’s preferences over plans as given, as part of her
CPS, regardless of whether they are obtained from underlying preferences over acts by
reduction.
Third, the assumption that the only “conditioning information” relevant to the pref-
erence relation t ω is the event Ft(ω) implies that our analysis is consequentialist:i n
particular, two actions a b ∈ At(ω) are ranked in the same way in any decision tree
where they may be available. To elaborate, if the actions a and b are available at a
history h =[ t ω a] consistent with a tree f, their ranking of course depends on the
realized event Ft(ω); however, prior choices and discarded alternatives on the path
to h—choices the DM has to make at counterfactual histories in f, or possible events
that did not occur—are irrelevant. This is a standard property of EU preferences and
Bayesian updating, and is preserved in most applications of non-EU and ambiguity-
sensitive preferences. However, some alternative theoretical approaches to dynamic
choice with non-EU preferences or under ambiguity relax consequentialism to salvage
dynamic consistency; this important point is discussed in Section 6.
To conclude, recall that a binary relation is a weak order if and only if it is complete
and transitive.
4. Main results
This section presents the main results of this paper. Theorem 1 in Section 4.2 shows that
sophistication provides a way to elicit conditional preferences over acts and trees from
prior preferences over trees. Section 4.3 then takes as primitive a CPS and provides a
deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 5) and characterization (Theorems 2 and 3)o fC Pi nt h ec o n t e x to f
choice under uncertainty. Section 4.4.1 considers CP for MEU preferences and prior-by-
prior updating, and Section 4.4.2 analyzes the value of information under CP . All proofs
are in the Appendix. Further motivation and discussion is provided in Section 5.
As a preliminary step, Section 4.1 formalizes the connection between dynamic con-
sistency, Bayesian updating, and Savage’s Postulate P2 mentioned in the Introduc-
tion. This result constitutes a useful benchmark, and aids in the interpretation of
Theorems 1–3.
4.1 Dynamic consistency, Bayesian updating, and Postulate P2
The main result of this subsection should be considered a “folk theorem”: various ver-
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Its original statement concerns preferences over acts; I restate it in terms of preferences
over plans merely to avoid introducing new notation.6 Also note that, while the deﬁni-
tion of a CPS involves general trees, throughout this subsection axioms, deﬁnitions and
results are explicitly restricted to preferences over plans.
Forsimplicity,assumethateveryeventintheﬁltrationF0     FT isnotSavage-null:
for every node (t ω),i ti snot t h ec a s et h a tp ∼ rt ωp for all p ∈ F
p
0 and r ∈ F
p
t .Ib e g i nb y
formalizing DC, Savage’s Postulate P2, and Savage’s qualitative notion of Bayesian up-
dating; I follow Savage (1954, Section 2.7) throughout, to which the reader is referred for
interpretation(forDC,seealsoEpsteinandSchneider2003). NotehoweverthatSavage’s
postulates and deﬁnitions pertain to all possible conditioning events, whereas I restrict
attention to the elements of the ﬁltration F0     FT.
Axiom 1 (Dynamic consistency (DC)). For all nodes (t ω) with t<Tand all actions
a b ∈ At(ω) such that {a} {b}∈F
p
t ,i fa(ω ) t+1 ω  b(ω ) for all ω  ∈ Ft(ω),t h e n{a} t ω
{b}; furthermore, if time-(t + 1) preferences are strict for some ω∗ ∈ Ft(ω),t h e n{a}  t ω
{b}.7
Axiom 2( P o s t u l a t eP 2 ) .For all plans p q ∈ F
p




rt ωp  st ωp ⇒ rt ωq  st ωq 8
NotethatDCrelatespreferencesatdifferenthistories;ontheotherhand,P2pertains
to prior preferences alone. As asserted in Section 2, the MEU preferences speciﬁed in
Section 2, jointly with the reduction assumption, yield a violation of Axiom 2:t a k er =
{a}, s ={ b}, p ={ ca0},a n dq ={ cb0}. This is, of course, the main message Ellsberg (1961)
conveys.
Finally, say that the restriction of t ω to F
p
t is derived from  via Bayesian updating
(cf. Savage 1954, p. 22) if, for all plans r s ∈ F
p
t ,
r t ω s ⇔ rt ωp  st ωp for some plan p ∈ F0 
ForexanteEUpreferences,theaboveconditionindeedcharacterizesBayesianupdating
of the DM’s prior. The following result is then straightforward.9
Proposition 1. Consider a CPS (t ω)t ω. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) The binary relation  is a weak order on F
p
0 , Axiom 2 (Postulate P2) holds, and
for every node (t ω), the restriction of t ω to F
p
t is derived from  via Bayesian
updating.
6That is, to further clarify, the resulting additional generality is inessential for my purposes.
7Variables a and b are actions, whereas the singleton sets {a} and {b} are trees; on the other hand, a(ω )
and b(ω ) are trees in Ft+1(ω). Finally, F
p
t is a set of plans, i.e., special types of trees, and t ω and t+1 ω 
are deﬁned over trees.
8A plan is, a fortiori, a t-period plan, so rt ωp, and so forth are well deﬁned: cf. Section 3.2.
9Theproofissimilartothatofanalogousresults(e.g., Ghirardato2002); itisavailableinasupplementary
ﬁle on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/supp/571/supplement.pdf.392 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
(ii) Every t ω is a weak order on F
p
t and Axiom 1 (DC) holds.
This result depends on the assumption of consequentialism implicit in the frame-
work: according to Deﬁnition 5, each preference t ω is deﬁned on (sub)trees with ini-
tial event Ft(ω) (cf. Section 6). For a version of this result that relaxes consequentialism,
see Epstein and Le Breton (1993).
Proposition 1 highlights the tension between dynamic consistency and ambiguity
that was anticipated in the Introduction. However, I now wish to emphasize the impli-
cations of this result for Bayesian updating. If one assumes that prior preferences satisfy
P2, then one can deﬁne conditional preferences via Bayesian updating and, in this case,
Proposition 1 implies that DC holds. Conversely, if one assumes that DC holds, Propo-
sition 1 implies that Bayesian updating provides a way to elicit conditional preferences;
furthermore, ex ante preferences necessarily satisfy P2.
4.2 Eliciting conditional preferences
Turn now to the main results of the paper, beginning with the elicitation of conditional
preferences. First, we adopt a standard requirement: the conditioning event should
“matter.”
Assumption 1 (Non-null conditioning events). For every node (t ω) and prizes x, y
such that x   y, there exists a plan g ∈ F
p
0 such that xt ωg   yt ωg.
For general preferences over acts or plans, Assumption 1 is stronger than the re-
quirement that every set Ft(ω) not be Savage-null (cf. Section 4.1); however, the two
notions coincide, for instance, for MEU (and of course EU) preferences. Assumption 1 is
weaker than analogous conditions in the literature, e.g., the notion of “non-null” event
in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001), which requires that g = y.
4.2.1 Beliefsaboutconditionalpreferences Ibeginbyproposingaprocedurethatelicits
theDM’sbeliefsaboutherownfuturepreferences; thedetailsaregiven in Deﬁnition4.T o
motivate it, refer to the decision tree in Figure 1 with x = 1; adopt the notation in (3)–(5).
Since {cb1} { ca1}∼{ c1} ex ante, it is argued in Section 2 that {a}  1 α {b} [equivalently,
{a}  1 β {b}]: if the DM prefers to commit to b at the second decision node, but deems
the tree {c1} just as good as committing to a, it must be the case that the DM expects to
choose a at the second decision node if both a and b are available.
However, this argument fails if {ca1}∼{ cb1}: in this case, the indifference {c1}∼{ ca1}
is not sufﬁciently informative as to the relative conditional ranking of a versus b.D e -
tecting conditional indifferences is even more delicate. Thus, a different but related ap-
proach must be adopted.
Definition 4. For all nodes (t ω) and trees f f   ∈ Ft(ω), f is conjecturally weakly pre-
ferred to f  given (t ω), written f 0
t ω f , if and only if a prize z ∈ X exists such that, for
all plans g ∈ F
p
0 ,
∀y ∈ X  y   z ⇒ (f ∪y)t ωg ∼ yt ωg and z   y ⇒ (f ∪y)t ωg ∼ ft ωg  (6)Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 393
Thesuperscript 0 inthenotation 0
t ω emphasizesthatthisconjecturalconditionalpref-
erence relation is deﬁned solely in terms of the DM’s time-0, i.e., prior preferences.
The logic behind Deﬁnition 4 is as follows. Suppose that the DM believes that
f t ω f . Under suitable regularity (in particular, solvability) assumptions that are cap-
tured by the axioms in the next subsection, a prize z ∈ X exists such that (the DM also
believes that) f t ω z t ω f . Now consider another prize y ∈ X such that a priori y   z;
if the DM does not expect her preferences over prizes to change, then (she believes that)
y  t ω z as well, and hence that y  t ω f . But this implies that she expects y to be chosen
rather than f  in the tree (f  ∪y)t ωg at node (t ω).10 As in the example of Section 2,t h e
exanteindifferencebetween(f ∪y)t ωg andyt ωg nowreﬂectsthisbelief. Theargument
for the case z   y is similar.
Note that for every tree considered in (6), there is a unique path from the initial his-
tory to the node (t ω),b e c a u s eg is a plan; furthermore, the event Ft(ω) is not Savage-
null. Hence, the DM “cannot avoid” contemplating her choices at that node.
4.2.2 Axioms and characterization The axioms I consider are divided into two groups.
Axioms 3–6 relate the DM’s actual conditional preferences with her prior preferences;
Axioms 7–9 instead concern the DM’s prior preferences only and ensure that the def-
inition of conjectural conditional preferences (in Deﬁnition 4)i sw e l lp o s e d( t h a ti s ,
noncontradictory).
Axiom 3 (Stable tastes). For all x x  ∈ X and all nodes (t ω), x t ω x  if and only if
x  x .
Axiom 4 (Conditional dominance). For all nodes (t ω),a l lf ∈ Ft(ω), and all x  x   ∈ X,
if x   f(h) x   for all terminal histories h of f,t h e nx  t ω f t ω x  .
Axiom 5 (Conditional prize-tree continuity). For all nodes (t ω) and all f ∈ Ft(ω),t h e
sets {x ∈ X :x t ω f} and {x ∈ X :x t ω f} are closed in X.
Axiom 6 (Weak sophistication). For all nodes (t ω),p l a n sg ∈ F
p
0 , trees f ∈ Ft(ω),a n d
prizes x ∈ X,
x  t ω f ⇒ (f ∪x)t ωg ∼ xt ωg and x ≺t ω f ⇒ (f ∪x)t ωg ∼ ft ωg 
Axiom 3 states that tastes, i.e., preferences over prizes, are unaffected by condition-
ing.11 Axioms 4 and 5 are standard, and ensure that conditional certainty equivalents
exist (recall that X is assumed to be a connected and separable topological space).
10The relationship f  ∪ y denotes the time-t tree that contains all actions in f  plus the unique initial
action in the plan f
y
t ω that leads to the prize y in every state of nature. In other words, the notation exploits
(a) the simpliﬁed notation for prizes and (b) the fact that trees are just sets of acts; therefore, unions of trees
are also well deﬁned trees.
11For the present purposes, it is sufﬁcient to impose this requirement on a suitably rich subset of prizes.
For instance, if X consists of consumption streams, it is enough to restrict Axiom 3 to constant streams.394 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Axiom 6 assumes just enough sophistication to ensure that conjectural and actual
conditionalpreferencescoincide: inparticular,thelogicofsophisticationisappliedonly
to comparisons between a tree and a constant prize, and then only if the DM has no
other choice available on the path to the node (t ω). Preferences at times t>0 are not
required to be sophisticated.
Turn now to the second group of axioms.
Axiom 7 (Prize continuity). For all ¯ x ∈ X,t h es e t s{x ∈ X :x  ¯ x} and {x ∈ X :x  ¯ x} are
closed in X.
Axiom 8 (Dominance). Fix a node (t ω),at r e ef ∈ Ft(ω),ap l a ng ∈ F
p
0 ,a n dap r i z e
x ∈ X.
(i) If f(h)  x for all terminal histories h of f,t h e n(f ∪x)t ωg ∼ ft ωg.
(ii) If f(h)≺ x for all terminal histories h of f,t h e n(f ∪x)t ωg ∼ xt ωg.
Axiom 8 reﬂects stability of preferences over outcomes. If the individual’s prefer-
ences over X do not change when conditioning on Ft(ω),t h e ni n( i )s h ee x p e c t snot to
choose x at node (t ω),b e c a u s ef yields strictly better outcomes at every terminal his-
tory; similarly for (ii). As in Section 2, the indifferences in (i) and (ii) capture the DM’s
expectations.
The next axiom is a “beliefs-based” counterpart to Axiom 6 (Weak sophistication).
Axiom 9 (Separability). Consider a node (t ω), f ∈ Ft(ω),p l a n sg g  ∈ F
p
0 ,a n dx y ∈ X.
Then the following statements can be made.
(i) (f ∪y)t ωg  ∼ ft ωg and x   y imply (f ∪x)t ωg  ∼ xt ωg ;
(ii) (f ∪y)t ωg  ∼ yt ωg and x ≺ y imply (f ∪x)t ωg  ∼ ft ωg .
To interpret, consider ﬁrst the case g = g  and ﬁx a prize y. According to the by now
familiar logic of belief elicitation, (f ∪y)t ωg  ∼ ft ωg indicates that the DM believes that
she does not strictly prefer f to y given Ft(ω)—otherwise indifference obtains. Thus, if
x   y and the DM’s preferences over X are stable, she also expects to strictly prefer x to
f given Ft(ω); again, the elicitation logic yields (f ∪ x)t ωg ∼ xt ωg. The interpretation
of (ii) is similar.
Additionally, Axiom 9 implies that these conclusions are independent of the partic-
ular t-period plan under consideration, and hence of what the decision problem looks
like if the event Ft(ω) does not obtain. In this respect, Axiom 9 reﬂects a form of “sepa-
rability.” More generally, Axiom 9 essentially requires that (6)i nDeﬁnition 4 holds for all
plans g or for none. There is a close analogy with the role of Savage’s Postulate P2: see
Section 4.1 for details.
The main result of this section can now be stated.
Theorem1. SupposethatAssumption1holds. ConsidertheCPS(t ω)andassumethat
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(i) The binary relation  satisﬁes Axioms 7–9; furthermore, for all nodes (t ω),
t ω=0
t ω.
(ii) For every node (t ω), t ω is a weak order and satisﬁes Axioms 3–6.
Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 in Section 4.1 are structurally similar: Axioms 7–9 play
the role of Postulate P2 (but add solvability requirements), the deﬁnition of conjectural
conditional preferences corresponds to Bayesian updating, and Axioms 3–6 correspond
to DC (but again add solvability requirements). The interpretation is also similar: under
Axioms 7–9, Deﬁnition 4 yields well behaved conditional preferences and hence can be
taken as the deﬁnition of conditional preferences; in this case, Axioms 3–6 hold. Con-
versely, if Axioms 3–6 hold, the beliefs derived via Deﬁnition 4 from prior preferences
are actually correct, so that Deﬁnition 4 c a nb es e e na saw a yt oelicit actual conditional
preferences. The main differences are that, of course, Theorem 1 does not rely on P2 or
DC and concerns preferences over nondegenerate trees.
4.3 A decision-theoretic analysis of consistent planning
4.3.1 Consistent planning under uncertainty As noted in the Introduction, consistent
planning (CP) is a reﬁnement of backward induction. If there are unique optimal ac-
tions at any point in the tree, the two concepts coincide. Otherwise, CP complements
backward induction with a speciﬁc tie-breaking rule: indifferences at a history h are
resolved by considering preferences at the history that immediately precedes h.
To illustrate, consider the tree in Figure 1 with x = 1, but assume MEU preferences
with priors C ={ q ∈  ( ): 1
90 ≤ q(α) ≤ 30
90  2
90 ≤ q(β) ≤ 15
90}. Continue to assume prior-
by-prior updating and reduction, and again adopt the notation in (3)–(5). It can then
be veriﬁed that {a}∼ 1 α {b}; however, {ca1} { cb1}, so CP prescribes that the DM follows
c with a. The corresponding plan {ca1} is strictly preferred to {s1}, so the unique CP
“solution” of this tree is the plan {ca1}.
Algorithmically, CP operates as follows. For each history h =[ t ω a] in a tree f,c o n -
siderﬁrstthesetCP0
f(h)ofactionsb ∈ At+|a|(ω)that,foreveryrealizationω  ∈ Ft+|a|(ω),
prescribeacontinuationactionat+|a|+1 ω  thathassurvivedprioriterationsoftheproce-
dure. Intuitively, such actions b correspond to plans that the DM actually follows. Then,
out of these actions, select the conditionally optimal ones: this completes the induction
step and deﬁnes the set CPf(h). Deﬁnition 5 is modeled after analogous deﬁnitions in
Strotz (1955–1956)a n dGul and Pesendorfer (2005), except that it is phrased in terms of
preferences, rather than numerical representations.
Definition 5 (Consistent planning). Consider a tree f ∈ Ft(ω). For every terminal his-
tory h =[ t ω a] consistent with f,l e tC P f(h) ={ f(h)}.I n d u c t i v e l y , i f h =[ t ω a] is





b ∈ At+|a|(ω):∃a ∈ f(h)s.t. ∀ω  ∈ Ft+|a|(ω) 
b(ω ) ={ a+1 ω } for some a+1 ω  ∈ CPf([t ω  a∪a])
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and
CPf(h) ={ b ∈ CP0
f(h):∀a ∈ CP0
f(h) {b} t+|a| ω {a}} 
Ap l a n{a}∈Ft(ω) is a consistent-planning solution of f if a ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]).12
Note that, to carry out the CP procedure, it is only necessary to specify the DM’s
preferencesoverplans. TheoutputoftheCPalgorithmisalsoasetofplans.13 Moreover,
it is straightforward to verify that if preferences over plans are complete and transitive,
then Deﬁnition 5 is well posed: it always delivers a nonempty set of solutions that the
DM deems equally good.
4.3.2 Behavioral characterization of consistent planning The behavioral analysis of CP
takes as input the DM’s CPS (t ω). The key assumption of sophistication was intro-
ducedinSection2;Axiom6appliesthesameprincipletoasmallsetoftrees,withunique
features. To capture the implications of Sophistication in general trees, it is assumed
that pruning conditionally dominated actions leaves the DM indifferent. Formally, if g
is a subset of actions available in tree f at history h, and every action b ∈ g is strictly
preferred to every action w that lies in f(h)but not in g, then ex ante the DM must be
indifferent between f and the tree ghf in which the inferior actions have been pruned.
Axiom 10 (Sophistication). For all f ∈ Ft,a l lh i s t o r i e sh =[ t ω a] consistent with f and
such that a  = ∅, and all g ⊂ f(h),i f ,f o ra l lb ∈ g and w ∈ f(h)\ g, {b}  t+|a| ω {w},t h e n
f ∼t ω ghf.
Observe that Axiom 10 is silent as far as indifferences at node (t +| a| ω)are con-
cerned. For instance, if f(h)={ a b} and {a}∼ t+|a| ω {b},t h ea x i o md o e snot require that
f ∼t ω {a}hf ∼t ω {b}hf. This allows for the possibility that, ex ante, the DM has a strict
preference for commitment to a or b; Axiom 11 deals with these situations. Axiom 10 is
also silent if h is the initial history of f: Axiom 12 below encodes the assumptions re-
quired in this case. This “division of labor” is crucial so as to avoid unduly restricting
ambiguity attitudes; see Section 5.2.
The next axiom formalizes the tie-breaking assumption that characterizes CP within
the class of backward-induction solutions: if the DM is indifferent among two or more
actions at a history h, then she can precommit (more precisely, expects to be able to
precommit) to any of them at the history that immediately precedes h. It is important
to emphasize that no such precommitment is possible in case the individual has strict
preferences over actions at h: in such cases, the full force of Axiom 10 (Sophistication)
applies.
12To help parse notation, a, a+1 ω , and b in this deﬁnition are acts; b(ω ) must, therefore, be a tree and,
in particular, the deﬁnition requires that it be the tree {a+1 ω } that has a single initial action a+1 ω  taken
fromtheset CPf([t ω  a∪a]). Finally, bracesin {b} t+|a| ω {a} arerequiredbecause t+|a| ω isdeﬁnedover
trees, not actions.
13Formally, CPf([t ω ∅]) is a set of actions, not plans; however, if a ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]),t h e n{a} is a plan.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 397
Figure 3. Next-period commitment version of Figure 1.
To formalize this assumption, the notion of a next-period commitment version of a
tree is required. Again, refer to the tree fx in Figure 1; as it turns out, the notation in (3)–
(5) greatly simpliﬁes the exposition. Consider a modiﬁed version of the tree fx ={ cx sx},
wheretheactioncx attheinitialhistory∅isreplacedwiththeactionscax andcbx.R e c a l l
that while cx allows a choice between a and b at the second decision node, cax and cbx
enforce a commitment to a and, respectively, b: cf. (4). The resulting tree {cax cbx sx},
referred to as the next-period commitment version of fx,i sd e p i c t e di nFigure 3.
To reﬂect the DM’s ability to precommit in case of future indifferences, it is assumed
that if {a}∼ 1 α {b}, the DM is indifferent ex ante between fx ={ cx sx} and its next-period
commitment version {cax cbx sx}.I n t u i t i v e l y ,i f{a}∼ 1 α {b}, the DM regards the original
tree as if it affords the same “physical” ability to commit as its next-period commitment
version.
In the tree fx, nontrivial future choices must be made only following cx and only if
ω ∈{ α β}; this simpliﬁes the construction of its next-period commitment version. For
a general tree, proceed as follows. Given a tree f at a node (t ω), ﬁx an initial action
a in the tree f;i ne v e r ys t a t eω  ∈ Ft(ω), a leads to a continuation tree a(ω ),w h i c hb y
deﬁnition is a set of time-(t + 1) actions (in the intended application of this deﬁnition,
i.e., Axiom 11, such actions are mutually indifferent, but the following deﬁnition does
notrequirethis). Outofthetime-(t+1) actionsin a(ω ),pickadistinguishedone a+1 ω .
Finally, construct a new action b available at time t that, for any state ω  ∈ Ft(ω),l e a d s
to the time-(t +1) tree containing the single initial action a+1 ω. Each possible choice of
initial action a and subsequent actions a+1 ω  leads to a different initial action b in the
next-period commitment version of f. Deﬁnition 6 formalizes this idea.
Definition 6. Fix a tree f ∈ Ft(ω). The next-period commitment version of f is the
tree
g ={ b ∈ At(ω):∃a ∈ f s.t. ∀ω  ∈ Ft(ω)∃a+1 ω  ∈ a(ω ) s.t. b(ω ) ={ a+1 ω }} 
Now consider a tree f at a node (t ω) and a history h consistent with f; suppose
that every action a ∈ f(h)and every realization of the uncertainty ω  ∈ Ft(ω) leads to
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the continuation tree f(h)with its next-period-commitment version g leaves the DM
indifferent at (t ω).
Axiom 11 (Weak commitment). For all f ∈ Ft and all histories h =[ t ω a] consistent
with f,i f ,f o ra l la ∈ f(h),a l lω  ∈ Ft+|a|(ω), and all a+1 b+1 ∈ a(ω ), it is the case that
{a+1}∼ t+|a|+1 ω  {b+1},t h e nf ∼t ω ghf,w h e r eg is the next-period commitment version of
f(h).
Finally, sophistication allows for the possibility that actions at future histories are
tempting for future preferences, even though they are unappealing for initial prefer-
ences (or vice versa). The following, standard axiom ensures that, in contrast, the avail-
abilityofchoicesattheinitial historyoff thataredeemedinferiorgiventhesameinitial
preference relation t ω is considered neither harmful (as might be the case if the DM
was subject to temptation) nor beneﬁcial (as is the case for a DM who has a preference
for ﬂexibility). This rules out deviations from standard behavior that are not due to dif-
ferences in information and perceived ambiguity at distinct points in time.
Axiom 12 (Strategic rationality). For all f g ∈ Ft(ω) such that f ⊂ g,i f ,f o ra l lb ∈ f and
w ∈ g, {b} t ω {w},t h e nf ∼t ω g.
It is now possible to state the main result of this section. Two related characteriza-
tions of CP are provided. The ﬁrst is better suited to the analysis of speciﬁc preference
models and updating rules (as in Section 4.4.1), and applications (as in Section 4.4.2).
The second emphasizes that all behavioral implications of CP can be identiﬁed on the
basis of prior preferences alone (as noted in the Introduction) and also has implications
for policy evaluation (cf. Section 5.3).
Begin by specifying the DM’s prior and conditional preferences over plans.N e x t ,
assume that this DM employs CP to determine her course of action in any given tree.
Then the DM’s CPS should indicate indifference between a tree f a n da n yo n eo fi t sC P
solution(s). The following theorem shows that this is the case precisely when Axioms
10–12 hold.
Theorem 2. Consider a CPS (t ω)0≤t<T ω∈  such that, for every t = 0     T and ω ∈  ,
t ω is a weak order on F
p
t (ω). The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Every t ω is a weak order on all of Ft(ω); furthermore, Axioms 10–12 hold.
(ii) For every node (t ω),e v e r yt r e ef ∈ Ft(ω), and every action a ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]),
f ∼t ω {a}.
Suppose instead that the axioms of this section are applied to the CPS
(0
t ω)0≤t<T ω∈  derived from the DM’s prior preference  via Deﬁnition 4.I nt h i sc a s e ,
Axioms 10–12 are effectively assumptions on the DM’s prior preferences; formulating
them in terms of the revealed conditional preferences 0
t ω is merely a matter of nota-
tional convenience. Leveraging Theorems 1 and 2, one then obtains Theorem 3.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 399
Theorem3. Consideraweakorder  on F0 thatsatisﬁesAssumption1, Axioms7–9,a n d
the CPS (0
t ω)0≤t<T ω∈  obtained from  via Deﬁnition 4. The following statements are
equivalent.
(i) Axioms 10–12 hold.
(ii) For every tree f ∈ F0 and action a ∈ CPf([0 ω ∅]), f ∼{ a}.
4.4 Applications
4.4.1 Consistent planning for MEU preferences and prior-by-prior updating To illus-
trate the results of Section 4.3.2, this subsection specializes Theorem 2 to the MEU deci-
sion model and prior-by-prior Bayesian updating, assuming reduction of plans to acts.
It is straightforward to adapt the analysis to different representations of preferences and
different updating rules (cf., e.g., Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993 or Eichberger et al. 2007
and Horie 2007).
Begin by noting that, if f ∈ Ft is a plan, every state ω determines a unique path
through f: formally, for every ω  ∈ Ft(ω), there is a unique list of actions a such that
[t ω  a] is terminal and consistent with f. Throughout this subsection, for every node
(t ω) and plan f ∈ Ft(ω), the notation f(ω)indicates the prize f(h),w h e r eh =[ t ω a]
is the unique terminal history consistent with f. The required assumption on prefer-
ences can now be stated.
Assumption 2( M E U ) . There exist a weak*-closed, convex set C of ﬁnitely additive prob-
abilities on (   ) and a continuous function u:X → R such that, for all plans f g ∈ F0,









Moreover, (i) there exist plans f g ∈ F0 such that f   g, and (ii) for every node (t ω) and
all q ∈ C, q(Ft(ω)) > 0.
Note that the MEU decision rule is often seen as embodying “pessimistic” expecta-
tions; by contrast, Axiom 11 in Section 4.3.2 is “optimistic” about one’s ability to carry
out ex ante preferred courses of action (provided one does not have opposite strict pref-
erences in the future).14
Assumption 2(i) states that ex ante preferences over acts are not trivial. Assump-
tion 2(ii) is a strengthening of the assumption that every conditioning event Ft(ω) is not
Savage-null; it ensures that prior-by-prior Bayesian updating is well deﬁned (cf. Pires
2002, Proposition 1 and p. 150).
Assumption 2 pertains solely to prior preferences (over plans); Axiom 13 below pro-
vides a link with conditional preferences over plans and, in particular, is shown to char-
acterize prior-by-prior updating. This axiom (see Siniscalchi 2001) recasts the main ax-
iominPires(2002)andJaffray(1994)inaformthatismoreeasilycomparedwithAxiom1
(DC) of Section 4.1.15
14I thank a referee for this observation.
15For a non-decision-theoretic analysis, see Walley (1991).400 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Axiom 13 (Constant-act dynamic consistency). For all plans p ∈ F
p
0 ,p r i z e sx ∈ X,a n d
non-terminal histories h =[ 0 ω a] consistent with p,16
(p(h) |a| ω x)∧(∀ω  / ∈ F|a|(ω) p(ω )  x)  ⇒ p  x
(p(h)  |a| ω x)∧(∀ω  / ∈ F|a|(ω) p(ω )  x)  ⇒ p   x
and
(p(h) |a| ω x)∧(∀ω  / ∈ F|a|(ω) p(ω )  x)  ⇒ p  x
(p(h) ≺|a| ω x)∧(∀ω  / ∈ F|a|(ω) p(ω )  x)  ⇒ p ≺ x 
Axiom 13 differs from Axiom 1 (DC) in two respects. First, Axiom 13 considers only
conditional comparisons between a plan p and a prize x,17 whereas Axiom 1 (DC) has
implications whenever two arbitrary plans are compared conditional on F|a|(ω).S e c -
ond, dominance, rather than conditional preference, is required outside of the condi-
tioning event F|a|(ω). Themotivationsfortheserestrictionsarediscussedinthesources
cited above (especially Pires 2002 and Siniscalchi 2001).
I now specialize the deﬁnition of CP to reﬂect the assumption that preferences over
plans at a node (t ω) are derived from an ex ante MEU preference via prior-by-prior
updating. Let u and C be as in Assumption 2; consider a tree f ∈ Ft(ω).F o r e v -
ery terminal history h =[ t ω a] consistent with f,l e tC P M E U f(h) ={ f(h)}.I n d u c -
tively, if h =[ t ω a] is consistent with f,a n dC P M E U f([t ω  a∪a]) is deﬁned for every




{b}⊂At+|a|(ω):∃a ∈ f(h)s.t. ∀ω  ∈ Ft+|a|(ω) 

















u(p (ω ))q(dω |Ft+|a|(ω))

 
Note that the assumption of prior-by-prior updating is embodied in the second line in
the deﬁnition of CPMEUf(h).T h ec o u n t e r p a r tt oTheorem 2 c a nt h e nb es t a t e d .
Theorem4. ConsideraCPS(t ω)0≤t<T ω∈ . SupposethatAssumption2holdsandthat
every event E ∈
T
t=0Ft is non-null. Then the following statements are equivalent.
16Note that the history h reaches node (|a| ω);h e n c et h en o t a t i o nF|a|(ω), |a| ω, and so forth.
17This is why the four cases p(h) t ω x, p(h)  t ω x, p(h) t ω x, and p(h) ≺t ω x must all be explicitly
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(i) For every node (t ω), t ω is a weak order on Ft; also, Axioms 10–13 hold.
(ii) For every node (t ω),t r e ef ∈ Ft(ω),a n da c t i o na ∈ CPMEUf([t ω ∅]), f ∼t ω {a}.
UnlikeTheorem2,theaboveresult(seestatement(ii)andthedeﬁnitionofCPMEUf)
has a speciﬁc implication for the way plans are evaluatedat a node (t ω):p r i o r - b y - p r i o r
updatingisemployed. Again,thisfollowsfromAxiom13,whichappearsinTheorem4(i).
4.4.2 Sophistication and the value of information This subsection analyzes a simple
model of information acquisition and addresses the concern noted in the Introduction
regarding the implications of CP: a sophisticated DM may reject freely available infor-
mation. I argue that this behavior reﬂects a basic trade-off between information acqui-
sition and commitment; this trade-off is difﬁcult to uncover when preferences over acts
only are considered, but becomes transparent in the richer setting of this paper.18
Consider an individual facing a choice between two alternative actions, a and b
(the term “action” is used informally here). Uncertainty is represented by a state space
  =  1 ×  2,w h e r e 1 =  2 ={ α β}. The individual receives H dollars if she chooses
action a and the second coordinate of the prevailing state is α or if she chooses action
b and the second coordinate of the prevailing state is β; otherwise, she receives L<H
dollars. Finally, prior to choosing an action, the DM can observe the ﬁrst coordinate of
the prevailing state.
The DM has risk-neutral MEU preferences over acts and evaluates plans by reduc-
tion. Her set of priors is C ={ λP + (1 − λ)Q:λ ∈[ 0 1]},w h e r eP Q∈  ( ) are deﬁned
by
P(α α)= Q(β β) = 1−2ε  P(α β) = P(β α)= ε = Q(α β) = Q(β α)
P(β β)= Q(α α)= 0 
The parameter ε lies in the interval (0  1
4) and should be thought of as being “small.”
In other words, this individual believes that the signal (ω1) is most likely equal to the
payoff-relevant component of the state (ω2), but the relative likelihood of ω2 = α versus
ω2 = β is ambiguous; furthermore, she assigns a (small and unambiguous) probability
ε to each state where the signal is “wrong” (i.e., different from the payoff-relevant com-
ponent). Finally, assume prior-by-prior updating. Note that the resulting conditional
preferences over acts are dynamically inconsistent (they violate Axiom 1 in Section 4.1).
The objective is to determine the value of the information conveyed by the signal
ω1; this value turns out to depend on whether the DM has the opportunity to commit to
subsequent, ω1-contingent choices (e.g., by writing a binding contract or by delegating
choices to an agent or machine). To adopt the formal framework of Section 3, it is useful
toconsiderfourplans,denotedpaa,pab,pba,andpbb (theformaldeﬁnitionsareomitted
for brevity). For instance, pab is the plan that prescribes the choice a after seeing ω1 = α
18Footnote 35 in Machina (1989) attributes a similar observation, albeit expressed in the language of
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and the choice b after observing ω1 = β; the DM evaluates it by “reducing” it to the act
that yields H if ω ∈{ (α β) (β α)} and L elsewhere. Under the assumed preferences,
pab   pba   paa ∼ pbb  (7)
If the individual acquires information and can commit, then she effectively faces the
tree fI C ≡ paa ∪pab ∪pba ∪pbb. Her preferred ex ante choice is pab,s ofI C ∼ pab.
If the DM does not acquire information, her feasible choices are the plans paa and
pbb: thus, she can trivially “commit” to either a or b regardless of the realization of ω1,
which she does not observe. Formally, she faces the tree fNI = paa ∪ pbb.B y ( 7), CP
implies that fNI ∼ paa ∼ pbb. The value of the signal ω1 under commitment is then the
difference between the MEU evaluation of pab and that of paa,n a m e l y(1−3ε)(H −L).
If the individual acquires information but cannot commit, then she faces a tree fI NC
wherein the choice of a versus b is made after observing ω1.19 If the individual is sophis-
ticated (as well as strategically rational), she determines her willingness to pay for the
information by taking into account the choices she actually makes after observing ω1:
in other words, she evaluates the tree fI NC according to its CP solution.
Under prior-by-prior updating, one can verify that the DM strictly prefers b after ob-
serving ω1 = α and prefers a after observing ω1 = β; therefore, by CP, fI NC ∼ pba.T h e
value of the signal ω1 is then the difference between the MEU evaluations of pba and
paa,n a m e l yε(H − L); since ε ∈ (0  1
4), this is positive, but smaller than in the commit-
ment case.
Tosummarize, iftheDMcanexogenouslycommit,informationisvaluable,asusual:
the DM has more options in the tree fI C than in the tree fNI (formally, fNI ⊂ fI C)a n d
this is of course beneﬁcial. Furthermore, and symmetrically, if the DM “exogenously”
receives information, then commitment is also valuable:i te x p a n d st h eeffective choice
set from just pba, the CP solution of fI NC,t ofI C. Finally, there is a trade-off between
information and commitment: the CP solution pba of fI NC is not a subset or superset of
fNI, so one cannot say a priori whether this sophisticated but dynamically inconsistent
DM should acquire information. For the preferences considered here, information is
valuable; however,inothersettings, thecommitmentproblemmaybesoseverethatthe
DM may rationally choose to pay a price so as to avoid information: for an interesting
example, see Eichberger et al. (2007, p. 892). Similar patterns of behavior also emerge
in related contexts featuring time-inconsistent but sophisticated decision makers; see,
e.g., Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and references therein.
5. Discussion of Theorems 1–3
5.1 Counterfactuals and conditional preferences20
Any treatment of dynamic choice involves statements about preferences at potentially
counterfactual decision points. In the tree of Figure 1, the second node is not reached if
19Formally, fI NC ={ c},w h e r et h ea c t i o nc satisﬁes, for instance, c(α) ={ aα bα},w i t haα bα:{ω :
ω 
1 = α}→{ 0 1},w h e r eaα(ω ) = 1 if ω 
2 = α and aα(ω ) = 0 otherwise, and similarly for bα.
20I thank a co-editor and the referees for several observations that guided and motivated this discussion.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 403
the ball drawn is green; in such case, one cannot directly observe the DM’s preferences
at that node. Consequently, substantive assumptions about conditional preferences are
required.
This issue arises even with dynamically consistent preferences (e.g., under EU). As
noted in Section 4.1, one may employ Bayesian updating to deﬁne conditional prefer-
ences based on prior ones, thereby ensuring that DC holds per Proposition 1; however,
the preferences thus deﬁned need not be the DM’s “actual” conditional preferences. As
noted in Section 4.1, one may equivalently assume that DC holds and employ Bayesian
updating to elicit conditional preferences; however, the DM’s “actual” conditional pref-
erencesmaybedynamicallyinconsistent, inwhichcaseBayesianupdatingelicitsaspu-
rious object. In other words, the Bayesian updating and DC assumptions may well be
incorrect from a descriptive point of view.
Theorem 1 is subject to the same qualiﬁcations. Whether one views Deﬁnition 4 as
aw a yt odeﬁne or elicit conditional preferences, a substantive assumption about condi-
tional preferences must be made: one either stipulates directly that t ω≡0
t ω “by ﬁat”




On the other hand, Theorem 3 can be “safely” interpreted as a behavioral character-
i z a t i o no fC Pi nt e r m so ft h eD M ’ sprior preferences over trees alone. The conjectural
preferences 0
t w can be interpreted as reﬂecting the DM’s prior beliefs about her future
behavior, and Axioms 10–12 then ensure that such beliefs “support” or “explain” her ex
ante choices.
5.2 An important caveat: Strong sophistication
Recall that the sophistication axiom has no implications in the case of indifferences at
futurenodes. Thisiscrucialtoavoidundulyrestrictingpreferencesoverplans.I fAxiom10
is strengthened by replacing strict preferences at future nodes with weak preferences,
one obtains the following axiom.
Axiom 14 (Strong sophistication). For all f ∈ Ft,a l lh i s t o r i e sh =[ t ω a] with a  = ∅
consistent with f, and all g ⊂ f(h),i f ,f o ra l lb ∈ g and w ∈ f(h)\ g, {b} t+|a| ω {w},t h e n
f ∼t ω ghf.
Refer to the tree in Figure1,w i t hx = 1 andnotation asper(3)–(5); considertheMEU
preferences described in Section 4.3.1,s oi np a r t i c u l a r{a}∼ 1 α {b} and {ca1} { cb1},
and the history h =[ 1 α c1], i.e., the second decision point: under Axion 14 (Strong
sophistication), {a}∼ 1 α {b} implies that {ca1}={ a}h{c1}∼{ c1}∼{ b}h{c1}={ cb1},w h i c h
is inconsistent with the preferences over acts (and plans) speciﬁed at the beginning of
Section 4.3.1.
The example points out the key problematic implication of Axion 14 (Strong sophis-
tication): itimpliesthat,looselyspeaking,iftheDMisindifferentbetweentwoactionsat
agivenhistory,shemustalsobeindifferentbetweenthematanyearlierhistory. Further-
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(Strong sophistication) does impose restrictions on preferences over acts (or, more gen-
erally, plans).
Indeed, it turns out that these restrictions are overly strong for a very broad class
of preferences. Say that preferences admit certainty equivalents if, for every (t ω) and
p ∈ F
p
t (ω),t h e r ei sx ∈ X with p ∼t ω x; this includes virtually all parametric models of
preferences over acts, assuming reduction. Also say that Ft(ω) is strongly non-null (for
) if, for all x y ∈ X and p ∈ F
p
t (ω), x   y implies xt ωp   yt ωp.21
Proposition 2. If each t ω is a weak order that admits certainty equivalents, each
Ft(ω) is strongly non-null, and Axioms 3 and 14 hold, then  satisﬁes Axiom 2 (Postu-
late P2), the restriction of each t ω to F
p
t is derived from  via Bayesian updating, and
Axiom 1 (DC) holds.
The basic intuition behind this result is fairly straightforward (although the actual
proof takes a different approach). Given a plan p and a history h consistent with p,
if x ∈ X is the certainty equivalent of p(h) at h,t h e nAxion 14 (Strong sophistication)
implies that, loosely speaking, x is also the “value” that the DM attaches to p(h) at any
history immediately preceding h. In other words, the DM can evaluate the plan p by
recursion, as with standard EU preferences. This recursive structure implies dynamic
consistency.
Proposition 2 thus implies that, in particular, Axiom 14 can preclude ex ante Ellsberg
preferences in the tree of Figure 1.22 More broadly, Axiom 14 rules out precisely the kind
of behavior that is the focus of the present paper. Axioms 10 and 11 are formulated so as
to avoid this.
5.3 Miscellaneous
Policy evaluation Welfare analysis is problematic in the presence of dynamic inconsis-
tency. Refer to the tree in Figure 1,w i t hx = 1 and preferences as in the Introduction;
consider a “policy” that removes action a. Suppose that an irreversible decision to im-
plement the policy must be made at time 0; can a deﬁnite recommendation be made,
despite the noted inconsistency of the DM’s preferences over acts? If the DM is sophis-
ticated, then at the initial node she strictly prefers that a be removed, even though she
anticipates being unhappy at the second node if a is indeed deleted. Gul and Pesendor-
fer (2008, p. 31) observe that “standard economic models identify choice with welfare”;
from this point of view, the argument just given supports a policy that removes a (again,
assuming an irreversible decision must be made at time 0).
The crux of the argument is that, in view of the results of this paper, there is no am-
biguity as to whose “choice” and “welfare” one is concerned with: there is a single in-
dividual, characterized by her time-0 preferences over decision trees, who in particular
21For MEU preferences with priors C, this corresponds to minq∈C q(Ft(ω)) > 0.
22In Section 2, modify the ex ante MEU preferences so C ={ q({α}) = 1
3 q({β}) ∈[ ε  2
3 − ε]} for some
small ε>0:t h e n{α β} and {γ} are strongly non-null and Proposition 2 applies. Of course, the analysis in
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strictly prefers the subtree with a removed to the tree f1. By way of contrast, if the de-
cision problem is interpreted as a game played by multiple selves, it is no longer clear
whose choices and welfare one should focus on; clear-cut policy prescriptions thus ne-
cessitatetheintroductionofanexogenouswelfarecriterion—perhapsonethattradesoff
the well-being of the different selves.
Extensions In the decision framework adopted in this paper, all trees are deﬁned with
respect to a ﬁxed ﬁltration F0     FT. However, if the DM holds well deﬁned prefer-
encesoverplansconditionalonarbitrary(non-null)events,Theorem2suggeststhatshe
can also compare two trees f and g that are each adapted to a different ﬁltration. This
is required, for instance, so as to model a DM who, at time 0, faces a choice between
two different information structures, of which neither is ﬁner than the other. Intuitively,
the DM can apply CP to f and g separately, and then rank these trees according to her
preferences over their respective CP solutions. By Theorem 2, this is equivalent to the
assumption that the axioms in Section 4.3.2 apply “ﬁltration by ﬁltration”; the straight-
forward details are omitted.
The previous version of this paper (Siniscalchi 2009a), provides results analogous to
thoseinSection4foramoregeneralclassofdecisiontreesthatallowstheagent’sactions
at any point in time to determine the information she can receive at subsequent nodes.
It also discusses the extension to a class of inﬁnite decision trees.
6. Related literature and alternative approaches
Kreps and Porteus (1978)
As was noted above, the notation adopted here for decision trees is closely related to
the formalization of a “decision problem” under risk in Section 3 of Kreps and Porteus
(1978), KP henceforth. Speciﬁcally, a time-t tree in the sense of the present paper is a (ﬁ-
nite) set of state-contingent menus of time-(t +1) trees, whereas in KP , a time-t decision
problem is a (closed) set of lotteries over (contemporaneous payoffs and) time-(t + 1)
continuationproblems. Thekeydifferencewith thispaperisthatKPproposeamodelof
recursive preferences, which satisﬁes dynamic consistency: see their central Axiom 3.1.
By way of contrast, the present paper is concerned precisely with violations of dynamic
consistency.
Segal (1990)
Again in the setting of risky choice, Segal (1990) studies preferences over two-stage lot-
teries that do not satisfy the reduction axiom; he also allows for non-EU risk attitudes.
As Segal states explicitly (Segal 1990, p. 353), decisions are made only ex ante in his
framework (i.e., before ﬁrst-stage lotteries are resolved); therefore, the issue of dynamic
(in)consistency simply does not arise. By way of contrast, the present paper focuses on
nondegenerate decision situations in which choices are made at two or more histories.406 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Karni and Safra (1989, 1990)
As noted in Section 2, Karni and Safra (1989, 1990) study economic applications of CP
(which they call behavioral consistency) to choice under risk with non-EU preferences.
These papers employ CP as a solution concept of a game played by agents, or selves,
of the decision maker; by way of contrast, the present paper is concerned with the
decision-theoretic foundations for CP .
The menu-choice literature and Gul and Pesendorfer (2005)
The approach in the present paper is inﬂuenced by the menu-choice literature initiated
by Kreps (1979) and further developed by Dekel et al. (2001)a n dGul and Pesendor-
fer (2001) in the context of certainty. The work of Epstein (2006)a n dEpstein et al.
(2008), which deals with non-Bayesian updating for EU preferences but does not allow
for broader risk or ambiguity attitudes, and does not focus on CP , is already mentioned
(cf. footnote 4).
Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) axiomatize a version of CP in the setting of dynamic
choice under certainty. Their Theorems 1 and 2 are loosely related to Theorem 1 in Sec-
tion 4.2 of this paper; they axiomatize ex ante preferences that admit a “weak Strotz
representation,” i.e., roughly speaking, a system of conditional preferences that gener-
ates it via CP . However, multiple conditional preference systems can generate the same
ex ante preferences (Gul and Pesendorfer 2005, p. 437); by way of contrast, Theorems 1
and 3 relate ex ante preferences to a unique CPS. Gul and Pesendorfer’s Theorem 3 (Gul
and Pesendorfer 2005, p. 439) is the closest counterpart to Theorem 2 in this paper: it
characterizes CP for a given time-0 preference on decision problems and a given collec-
tion of conditional choice correspondences.23 However, their key axiom Independence
of Redundant Alternatives (IRA) corresponds to Axiom 14 (Strong sophistication) dis-
cussed in Section 5.2. As noted in Section 5.2, this is too strong an assumption for the
purposes of this paper, as it implies a strong form of dynamic consistency.
Hammond (1988) and related contributions
Hammond (1988) also takes the DM’s behavior in decision trees as given. He proposes
a notion of “consequentialism” that differs signiﬁcantly from the one discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3 (cf. Machina 1989, p. 1641); call this property H consequentialism. Hammond’s
main result shows that a behavioral rule satisﬁes H consequentialism, consequential-
ism in the sense of Section 3.3, and continuity if and only if it is consistent with EU.
In other words, Hammond emphasizes that assumptions about dynamic-choice behav-
ior can provide a foundation for (atemporal) EU preferences over acts. In contrast, the
assumptions on dynamic-choice behavior considered in this paper are speciﬁcally de-
signed not to restrict preferences over acts in any way. Rather, Hammond’s result is re-
lated to Propositions 1 and 2 (loosely speaking, with H consequentialism playing the
role of DC or strong sophistication).
23In the statement of Theorem 3 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2005), the phrase “weak Strotz representa-
tion” should actually read “canonical Strotz representation,” as I have conﬁrmed with the authors (the term
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For two-period decision problems under risk, Gul and Lantto (1990)p r o p o s ew e a k -
eningsofHconsequentialismanddynamicconsistency,andshowthat,underreduction
of compound lotteries, the properties they propose are equivalent to the assumption
that preferences over lotteries satisfy Dekel’s betweenness axiom (Dekel 1986). Grant
et al. (2000) focus on value-of-information problems; they do not require reduction of
two-stage lotteries, and assume suitable versions of DC and strong sophistication (cf.
Section 5.2). They identify conditions on ex ante preferences over two-stage lotteries
that are necessary and sufﬁcient for the DM to prefer more information to less. Thus,
like Hammond (1988), both papers relate dynamic-choice behavior to properties of ex
ante preferences over lotteries; in contrast, the present paper does not impose or derive
restrictions on ex ante preferences over acts or plans.
Recursive preferences under ambiguity
In an inﬂuential paper, Epstein and Schneider (2003) characterize the class of MEU
preferences over acts that are recursive, and hence dynamically consistent, in all de-
cision trees consistent with a given ﬁltration. This permits the application of standard
dynamic-programmingtechniqueseveninthepresenceofambiguity. Maccheronietal.
(2006)a n dKlibanoff et al. (2009) adapt this approach to different preference models.
Epstein and Schneider’s dynamic consistency requirement corresponds to Axiom 1
(DC) in Section 4.1; while this assumption does allow for nontrivial manifestations of
ambiguity aversion at each decision node, by Proposition 1 it implies that prior prefer-
ences must satisfy Savage’s Postulate P2 relative to every conditioning event in the ﬁltra-
tion under consideration. In particular, as noted in Section 4.1, in the tree of Figure 1,
theirrequirementrulesoutthemodal(ambiguity-averse)preferencesattheinitialnode.
In contrast, the approach in this paper does not restrict preferences over acts.
Nonconsequentialist choice
An alternative approach to dynamic choice with non-EU preferences, advocated in the
context of risky choice by Machina (1989)a n dMcClennen (1990), among others, es-
sentially24 allows conditional preferences at a history h to depend on the “context” of
the entire decision tree, so as to preserve optimality of the ex ante optimal plan. Thus,
this approach espouses dynamic consistency, but drops consequentialism. Hanany and
Klibanoff (2007, 2009) implement this approach for a broad class of ambiguity-averse
preferences.
When consequentialism is relaxed in the presence of ambiguity, interpreting the ef-
fect of information on preferences can be problematic. In particular, the same infor-
mation may appear to eliminate ambiguity (or perception thereof) in one decision tree
and preserve it in another: I provide an example in Siniscalchi (2009b). This conclu-
sion stands in sharp contrast with the prevailing view of ambiguity as an informational
phenomenon.
Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009) discuss further difﬁculties with violations of
consequentialism.
24This necessarily brief summary overlooks nuances among different proponents of this approach.408 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (eliciting conditional preferences)
Remark 1. Fix a node (t ω) and let ≥ be a weak order on Ft(ω) such that (i) for all
x y ∈ X, x ≥ y if and only if x  y, (ii) if x ∈ X satisﬁes x  f(h)[resp. x  f(h)] for all
terminal histories h consistent with f ∈ Ft(ω),t h e nx ≥ f [resp. f ≥ x], and (iii) the sets
U ={ x ∈ X :x ≥ f} and {x ∈ X :f ≥ x} are closed in X. Then there are two conditions:
(a) For every f ∈ Ft ω, there exists x ∈ X such that x ≥ f and f ≥ x (abbreviated x = f).
(b) If f>g ,t h e r ei sx ∈ X such that f>x>g.
The proof of this remark is routine, hence it is omitted.
Turn to Theorem 1.F o rf f  ∈ Ft(ω) and g ∈ Ft
0,w r i t ef 0
t ω|g f  to denote that (6)
holds for g and for a suitable z ∈ X.T h u s ,f 0
t ω f  if and only if f 0
t ω|g f  for all g ∈ F
p
0 .
Assume that part (ii) holds and consider a node (t ω). Suppose that f t ω f  and
let z ∈ X be such that z ∼t ω f :s u c hap r i z ee x i s t sb yRemark 1.F i xg ∈ F0 arbitrarily:
Iclaimthatf 0
t ω|g f ,sof 0
t ω f . Toseethis,supposeﬁrsty   z,soy  t ω z by Axiom3;
then y  t ω f  by transitivity and Axiom 6 implies that (f  ∪y)t ωg ∼ yt ωg. Next, suppose
that y ≺ z: again invoking Axiom 3 and transitivity, we get y ≺t ω f,a n dAxiom 6 implies
(f ∪ y)t ωg ∼ ft ωg. This proves the claim. In the opposite direction, consider f f   ∈
Ft(ω) and suppose that f 0
t ω f ;l e tz ∈ X be such that (6) holds for all g ∈ F
p
0 . Suppose,
tothecontrary,that z  t ω f,sother eexisty  y   ∈ X suchthatz  t ω y   t ω y    t ω f (by
Remark 1). Now Deﬁnition 4 implies (f ∪y )t ωg ∼ ft ωg ∼ (f ∪y  )t ωg for all g ∈ F
p
0 ,b u t
Axiom 6 and the assumption that Ft(ω) is not null imply (f ∪ y )t ωg ∼ y 
t ωg   y  
t ωg ∼
(f ∪ y  )t ωg for some such g: this is a contradiction. Hence, f t ω z; similarly, z t ω f 
and it follows that f t ω f .
It remains to be shown that  satisﬁes Axioms 9 and 8 (Axiom 7 is immediately im-
plied by Axioms 3 and 5). Consider ﬁrst Axiom 9:ﬁ xan o d e(t ω), f ∈ Ft ω, g g  ∈ F
p
0 ,
and x y ∈ X. For (i), suppose that (f ∪ y)t ωg  ∼ ft ωg and x   y.B y Axiom 6,t h e
ﬁrst relation implies that f t ω y, so by transitivity f ≺t ω x,a n dAxiom 6 implies that
(f ∪ x)t ωg  ∼ xt ωg . The argument for (ii) is similar. Finally, consider Axiom 8.I f
f(h)  x for all terminal histories h consistent with f, then, since f is ﬁnite, there is
y ∈ X such that y   x and f(h) y for all terminal h.N o wAxiom 4 implies f t ω y and,
hence, f  t ω x;t h e nAxiom 6 implies (f ∪x)t ωg ∼ ft ωg, as required. The argument for
(ii) is similar.
Now assume that (i) holds. To streamline the exposition, for any node (t ω) and
f f  ∈ Ft ω,c a l la n yz ∈ X with the properties in Deﬁnition 4 for all g ∈ F
p
0 a cutoff for
f 0
t ω f .
Claim 1. For every node (t ω), 0
t ω is transitive.
Consider f f  f   ∈ Ft ω such that f 0
t ω f  and f  0
t ω f  ,a n dl e tx x  ∈ X be the
respective cutoffs (which, remember, must apply for all g ∈ F
p
0 ). Then it must be the
case that x  x ; otherwise, consider y  y   ∈ X such that x    y    y     x (which exist byTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 409
Remark 1): by Assumption 1,f o rs o m eg ∈ F
p
0 , y 
t ωg   y  
t ωg, and since f 0
t ω|g f  must
hold, we conclude that (f  ∪ y )t ωg ∼ y 
t ωg   y  
t ωg ∼ (f  ∪ y  )t ωg;b u tf  0
t ω|g f   must
also hold and it implies (f  ∪y )t ωg ∼ f 
t ωg ∼ (f  ∪y  )t ωg, so a contradiction results.
Now consider y ∈ X and ﬁx an arbitrary g ∈ F
p
0 .I fy   x ,t h e nf  0
t ω|g f   implies
(y∪f  )t ωg ∼ yt ωg;ifinsteady ≺ x ,theny ≺ xandf 0
t ω|g f  implies(f ∪y)t ωg ∼ ft ωg.
Hence, x  is a cutoff for f 0
t ω f  .
Claim 2. Fix a node (t ω) and x y ∈ X.T h e nx  y if and only if x 0
t ω y.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
x   y implies (x∪y)t ωg ∼ xt ωg for all g ∈ F
p
0 .
Suppose x  y and ﬁx an arbitrary g ∈ Ft
0.F o r a l l x    y, Axiom 8 implies that
(x ∪y)t ωg ∼ x 
t ωg; similarly, for all x  ≺ y,a l s ox  ≺ x,a n dAxiom 8 implies (x∪x )t ωg ∼
xt ωg.H e n c e ,y is a cutoff for x 0
t ω y.
Conversely, suppose x 0
t ω y and let y  be a cutoff. If y  ≺ z ≺ y,t h e nf o ra n yg ∈
F
p
0 , Axiom 8 implies (z ∪ y)t ωg ∼ yt ωg,b u tDeﬁnition 4 requires (z ∪ y)t ωg ∼ zt ωg:
since Ft(ω) is non-null, this is a contradiction. Hence, y   y and, similarly, x  y .B y
transitivity, x  y.
Claim3. Fix a node (t ω), f ∈ Ft ω and x ∈ X. Then either f 0
t ω x or x 0
t ω f (or both).
Inparticular,ifx x  ∈ X satisfyx  f(h) x  forallterminalhistorieshconsistentwithf,
then x 0
t ω f and f 0
t ω x .
Suppose that it is not the case that f 0
t ω x.T h e ni np a r t i c u l a rx is not a cutoff; by
Claim 2,f o ra l ly   x, (y ∪x)t ωg ∼ yt ωg for all g ∈ F
p
0 , so there must be y ≺ x and g∗ ∈ F
p
0
such that (f ∪ y)t ωg∗  ∼ ft ωg∗.T h e nAxiom 9 implies that for all y    y and all g ∈ F
p
0 ,
(f ∪ y )t ωg ∼ y 
t ωg. On the other hand, for all y  ≺ y,a l s oy  ≺ x,s oClaim 2 implies
(x∪y )t ωg ∼ xt ωg for all g ∈ F
p
0 .H e n c e ,y  is a cutoff for x 0
t ω f.
If x x  are as above, then Axiom 8 implies that for every y ≺ x  and g ∈ F
p
0 ,
(f ∪ y)t ωg ∼ ft ωg,a n dClaim 2 implies that for every y   x  and g ∈ F
p
0 , (y ∪ x )t ωg ∼
yt ωg.T h u s ,f 0
t ω x  and the other relation follows similarly.
Claim 4. Fix a node (t ω) and f ∈ Ft(ω). Then there exists x ∈ X such that x ∼0
t ω f (i.e.,
x 0
t ω f and f 0
t ω x both hold). Hence, 0




t ωf{y : x  y}. NoticethatLisanintersectionofclosedsetsbyAxiom7
and hence is closed. Also, the last part of Claim 3 shows that there always exists x ∈ X
suchthatx 0
t ω f. Since0
t ωistransitivebyClaim1,iff 0
t ω y,thenx 0
t ω y (andhence
x  y) for every x ∈ X such that x 0
t ω f:t h u s ,f 0
t ω y implies y ∈ L. On the other hand,
suppose f  0
t ω y: then, in particular, y cannot be a cutoff and, as in the proof of Claim 3,
Claim 2 implies that there must exist x ≺ y and g∗ ∈ F
p
0 such that (f ∪ x)t ωg∗  ∼ ft ωg∗.
Then Axiom 9 implies that for all x    x and g ∈ F
p
0 , (f ∪x )t ωg ∼ x 
t ωg;a l s o ,b yClaim 2,
for all x  ≺ x and g, (x ∪ x )t ωg ∼ xt ωg.T h u s ,x is a cutoff for x 0
t ω f, and since y/ ∈
{y :x  y }, y/ ∈ L.T h u s ,L ={ y :f 0
t ω y}; as noted above, this set is nonempty. Similarly,
the set U ={ y :y 0
t ω|g f} is nonempty and closed.410 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
By Claim3, U∪L = X,sother eexistsx ∈ U∩L,whichbydeﬁnitionsatisﬁesx ∼0
t ω f.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, note ﬁrst that 0
t ω is complete and transitive
on Ft(ω) by Claims 4 and 1, respectively; by Claim 2,i ts a t i s ﬁ e sAxiom 3;b yClaim 3,i t
satisﬁes Axiom 4;b yClaim 4 and Axiom 7,i ts a t i s ﬁ e sAxiom 5.
Finally, we verify that it also satisﬁes Axiom 6.F i x a n o d e (t ω), f ∈ Ft(ω),a n d
x ∈ X. Suppose f  0
t ω x;i f(f ∪ x)t ωg∗  ∼ ft ωg∗ for some g∗ ∈ F
p
0 ,t h e nAxiom 9 and
Claim 2 imply that, for all g ∈ F
p
0 , y   x implies (f ∪ y)t ωg ∼ yt ωg and y ≺ x implies
(x ∪ y)t ωg ∼ xt ωg. Thus, by deﬁnition x 0
t ω f, which is a contradiction. Similarly,
suppose x  0
t ω f:i f(f ∪ x)t ωg∗  ∼ xt ωg∗ for some g∗,t h e nf o ra l lg ∈ F
p
0 , y ≺ x implies
(f ∪ y)t ωg ∼ ft ωg and y   x implies (x ∪ y)t ωg ∼ xt ωg, i.e., x is a cutoff for f 0
t ω x,
which is a contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Theorems 2 and 3 (consistent planning)
Say that history h =[ t ω a] precedes history h  =[ t  ω  a ] if and only if t = t ,
Ft+|a|(ω) = Ft+|a|(ω ), andeither a = ∅,o re l s ea = (at     aτ) and a  = (at     aτ a 
τ+1 
    a 
τ+τ ) for some τ  ≥ 0.I n t h i s c a s e , w r i t e h ≤H h . The notation h< H h  means
h ≤H h  and not h  ≤H h; h =H h  instead means that h ≤H h  and h ≤H h .O b s e r v et h a t
h =H h  if and only if h =[ t ω a] and h  =[ t ω  a] for some ω  ∈ Ft+|a|(ω). Finally, if h,
h  are consistent with f,t h e nh immediately precedes h , written h< ∗
H h ,i fh< H h  and
there is no history h   such that h< H h   <H h .
Begin with two preliminary remarks. First, the set of actions that CP associates with
a given history h in a tree f depends only on the continuation tree f(h).
Remark 2. For every node (t ω) with t<T,t r e ef ∈ Ft(ω), and nonterminal history h =
[t ω  a] consistent with f, CP0
f(h) = CP0
f(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]) and CPf(h) = CPf(h)([t +|a| 
ω  ∅]).
Proof. Suppose ﬁrst t +| a|=T − 1. Note that for every a ∈ f(h)and ω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω ),
[t ω   a ∪ a] is consistent with f and [t +| a| ω   ∅ ∪ a] is consistent with f(h);f u r -
thermore, f([t ω   a ∪ a]) = a(ω  ) = (f(h))([t +| a| ω   ∅ ∪ a]). Therefore, for every
a ∈ f(h)and ω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω ),C P f([t ω   a ∪ a]) ={ a(ω  )}=CPf(h)([t +| a| ω   ∅ ∪ a]).
This immediately implies that CP0
f(h) = CP0
f(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]) and thus also CPf(h) =
CPf(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]).
The induction step is immediate: if, for every a ∈ f(h)and ω   ∈ Ft(ω ),i ti st h ec a s e
thatCPf([t ω   a∪a]) = CPf(h)([t+|a| ω   ∅∪a]),thenDeﬁnition5readilyimpliesthat
CP0
f(h) = CP0
f(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]) and thus also CPf(h) = CPf(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]). 
Second, CP solutions are measurable with respect to the partitions F0     FT−1.
Hence, only ﬁnitely many histories of any given tree need to be considered to evaluate
it.
Remark 3. For every node (t ω) with t<T,t r e ef ∈ Ft(ω),a n dh i s t o r yh consistent with
f,i fh  =H h,t h e nh  is consistent with f and f(h ) = f(h).C o n s e q u e n t l y , CPf(h) =
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Proof. Sinceh =H h ,onecanwriteh =[ t ω  a]andh  =[ t ω   a],withω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω )
and ω  ∈ Ft(ω). Since Ft+|a|(ω ) ⊂ Fτ(ω ) for ¯ t = t     t+| a|−1,i ti st h ec a s et h a tω   ∈
F¯ t(ω ) for such ¯ t;i np a r t i c u l a r ,ω   ∈ Ft(ω ) = Ft(ω),s oh  is consistent with f.
If a = ∅,t h e nf(h ) = f = f(h). Otherwise, let a = (at     aτ),w i t haτ ∈ Aτ(ω );
since t +| a|=t + (τ − t + 1) = τ + 1, then by assumption, Fτ+1(ω  ) = Fτ+1(ω ) and aτ
is Fτ+1-measurable; hence, f(h)= aτ(ω ) = aτ(ω  ) = f(h ). The last implication follows
from Remark 2. 
Next, a technical issue must be addressed. Recall from Section 3.2 that if h =[ t ω a]
is a history consistent with the tree f,w i t ha =[ at     aτ],t h ecomposite tree ghf is
obtained by iteratively constructing actions ¯ at     ¯ aτ and replacing the initial action at
in f with ¯ at. One consequence is that the history h itself is no longer consistent with
ghf: rather, in a natural sense, it corresponds to the history [t ω (¯ at     ¯ aτ)]. Indeed,
any history h  =[ t ω  a ] consistent with f,w i t ha  = (a 
t     a 
τ )  = ∅ and a 
t = at,i sn o
longer consistent with ghf. Thus, it is necessary to construct the history corresponding
to such h  in ghf and to deﬁne notation for it.
To this end, continue to denote by (¯ at     ¯ aτ) the action sequence constructed in
the deﬁnition of the composite act ghf. Assume ﬁrst that h  is not initial and a 
t = at.
Let σ be the largest number in {t     τ} such that a 
¯ t = a¯ t and ω  ∈ F¯ t(ω) for ¯ t = t     σ.
Then deﬁne the image of h  in ghf, denoted h |ghf,a s[t ω  (¯ at     ¯ aσ a 
σ+1     a 
τ )].
If instead h  is initial or a 
t  = at,t h e ns i m p l yl e th |ghf = h .
While h |ghf is formally deﬁned for all histories h  consistent with f,i ti snot a
history (let alone one consistent with ghf)i nc a s eh strictly precedes h  (except for
g ={ a 
τ+1}). However, h |ghf is ahistoryconsistentwith ghf if h doesnotstrictlyprecede
h  (the case of interest in the proof of Theorem 2). The following remark establishes this
and other useful facts.
Lemma 1. Let h, h  be histories consistent with f ∈ Ft,w i t hh  <H h . Then there
(i) A history h |ghf is consistent with ghf.
(ii) If h   is another history consistent with f and such that h  <H h  ,t h e nh  ≤H h   if
and only if h |ghf ≤H h  |ghf.
(iii) If also h   =H h, then there is a surjection α:f(h ) → (ghf)(h |ghf) such that if
a  ∈ f(h ), h  =[ t ω  a ],a n dh |ghf =[ t ω  b ],t h e n[t ω   a  ∪ a ]|ghf =[ t ω   
b  ∪α(a )] for all ω   ∈ Ft+|a |(ω ).
(iv) If neither h ≤H h  nor h  ≤H h,t h e n(ghf)(h |ghf)= f(h ).
Proof.W r i t eh =[ t ω a] and let notation be as in the construction of h |ghf.T h e
assumption that h  <h   rules out the possibility that σ = τ<τ  . Also, the ﬁrst claim
is immediate if σ = τ  ≤ τ. Thus, assume that σ<min(τ τ ). I tm u s tb es h o w nt h a t
a 
σ+1 ∈ ¯ aσ(ω );t h e r ea r et w oc a s e s .
If ω  / ∈ Fσ+1(ω),then,accordingtothedeﬁnitionof (¯ at     ¯ aτ), ¯ aσ(ω ) = aσ(ω ) and
by assumption a 
σ+1 ∈ a 
σ(ω ); furthermore, by deﬁnition, a 
σ = aσ.T h u s ,a 
σ+1 ∈ ¯ aσ(ω ).412 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
If instead ω  ∈ Fσ+1(ω),t h e n¯ aσ(ω ) = ¯ aσ(ω) ={¯ aσ+1}∪(aσ(ω) \{ aσ+1});f u r t h e r -
more, by deﬁnition, a 
σ+1  = aσ+1 and a 
σ = aσ.B e c a u s eh  is a history, a 
σ+1 ∈ a 
σ(ω ) =
aσ(ω ) = aσ(ω); but since a 
σ+1  = aσ+1, it follows that a 
σ+1 ∈ aσ(ω) \{ aσ+1} and, there-
fore, a 
σ+1 ∈ ¯ aσ(ω) = ¯ aσ(ω ).
Thesecondclaimisimmediateifh  isinitial;otherwise,writeh  =[ t ω  (a 
t     a 
τ )]
and h   =[ t ω   (a  
t      a  
τ  )],l e tσ  be the largest index in {t     τ} such that a¯ t = a 
¯ t
and F¯ t(ω) = F¯ t(ω ) for ¯ t = t     σ,a n dd e ﬁ n eσ   analogously for h  . Since a 
¯ t = a  
¯ t for
¯ t = t     τ  and Fτ +1(ω ) = Fτ +1(ω  ),i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tσ  ≤ σ  ;f u r t h e r m o r e ,t h e
argument for the ﬁrst claim indicates that σ  ≤ τ . The second claim then follows imme-
diately if σ  = τ ;m o r e o v e r ,i fσ  <τ  , then we must also have σ  = σ  ,b e c a u s ea 
σ +1 =
a  
σ +1 andFσ +1(ω ) = Fσ +1(ω  ):b u tt h e nh |ghf =[ t ω  (¯ at     ¯ aσ a 
σ +1     a 
τ )]≤ H
[t ω   (¯ at     ¯ aσ a 
σ +1     a 
τ  a  
τ +1     a  
τ  )]=h  |ghf, as required. The converse im-
plication follows by reversing the roles of f and ghf, and, correspondingly, the roles of
h  and h  ,a n dh |ghf and h  |ghf,b e c a u s ef =[ f(h)]h|ghf[ghf].
For the third claim, again refer to the notation in the construction of h |ghf.I fh  is
not initial and a 
t  = at,t h e nh |ghf = h  and, furthermore, (ghf)(h ) = a 
τ (ω ) = f (h ),
so α can be taken to be the identity map. Next, if h  is initial, a surjection α with the
required properties can be obtained by letting α(a) = a for every a ∈ f(h ) \{ at} and
α(at) = ¯ at. Finally, if h  is not initial, let σ be as in the construction of h |ghf.A s i n
the proof of the ﬁrst claim, it cannot be the case that σ = τ<τ  ,b e c a u s eh  <h h ,s o
either σ<min(τ τ ) or σ = τ  ≤ τ. In the ﬁrst case, the last action in both h  and h |ghf
is a 
τ ,s o(ghf)(h |ghf)= a 
τ (ω ) = f (h ) and α can be taken to be the identity map. In
the second case, the last action in h |ghf is ¯ aτ , whereas the last action in h  is a 
τ  =
aτ . There are two subcases: if ω  ∈ Fτ +1(ω),t h e nw em u s th a v eτ  <τbecause h  =H
h :t h e n(ghf)(h |ghf)= ¯ aτ (ω ) ={¯ aτ +1}∪(aτ (ω ) \ aτ +1), f (h ) = a 
τ (ω ) = aτ (ω ),
and a suitable α is given by α(a) = a for a  = aτ +1 and α(aτ +1) = ¯ aτ +1. If, instead, ω  / ∈
Fτ +1(ω),t h e n(ghf)(h |ghf)= ¯ aτ (ω ) = aτ (ω ) = a 
τ (ω ) = f (h ) and α can again be
taken to be the identity.
Finally, let h and h  be as in the fourth claim. Since h and h  are unranked by ≤H,
neither can be initial, so a  =[ a 
t     a 
τ ];i ta l s oc a n n o tb et h ec a s et h a tω  ∈ Fτ +1(ω),
because otherwise h  ≤H h. Then the proof of the third claim shows that α:f(h ) →
(ghf)(h |ghf)can be taken to be the identity map, and the result follows. 
For sufﬁciency, assume part (i) in Theorem 2. I will show that, for all (t ω) and f ∈
Ft(ω),
f ∼t ω CPf([t ω ∅]); (8)
to interpret, recall that for every history h consistent with f,C P f(h) is a set of acts and,
hence, can itself be viewed as a tree in Ft(ω).B yAxiom 12 and the deﬁnition of CPf(h),
for every a ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]), {a}∼ t ω CPf([t ω ∅]); transitivity then implies that Theo-
rem 2(ii) holds.
Fix a node (t ω) and a tree f ∈ Ft(ω). Now construct a sequence f0     fN of trees
by iteratively replacing continuation trees f(h) with the corresponding CP solutions
CPf(h). To do so, two issues must be addressed. First, if   is inﬁnite, there are inﬁnitelyTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 413
many histories consistent with f; however, by Remark 3, these can be partitioned into
equivalence classes, each element of which yields the same continuation tree and set of
CP solutions. Second, as the tree f is iteratively modiﬁed, one must keep track of the
image of its histories in the modiﬁed trees; however, the notation developed above and
in Lemma 1 makes this relatively straightforward.
To address the ﬁrst issue, for every τ = t     T, ﬁx a collection  τ ⊂   such that,
for every Eτ ∈ Fτ, there is a unique ω(Eτ) ∈  τ such that ω(Eτ) ∈ Eτ.T h e n l e t H0 be
the collection of all nonterminal histories h =[ t  ¯ ω a] consistent with f and such that
¯ ω ∈  t+|a| (the reason for the superscript 0 is clariﬁed momentarily). Since f(h)is ﬁnite
for every history h consistent with f and every  τ is ﬁnite, the set H0 is also ﬁnite.
Next, to address the second issue, deﬁne a sequence of iteratively modiﬁed trees
as follows. First, let f0 = f. Then enumerate the elements of H0 as h0 1     h0 N in
such a way that, for all n m ∈{ 0     N}, n<mimplies h0 n  <H h0 m: that is, since, by
construction, h0 n  =H h0 m,e i t h e rh0 m strictly precedes h0 n or the two histories are not
ordered by the precedence relation.
The induction step consists of the following two substeps. Let n>0 and assume that
the tree fn−1 is already deﬁned, along with the collection {hn−1 1     hn−1 N}.
• Let fn = CPf(h0 n)hn−1 nfn−1.
• For m = 1     N,l e thn m = hn−1 m|ghn−1 nfn−1 if hn−1 n  <H hn−1 m; else, let hn m =
hn−1 m.
To elaborate, the tree fn is obtained from fn−1 by replacing the current continuation
at the history hn−1 n, which intuitively corresponds to h0 n, with the set of consistent-
planningsolutionsof f ath0 n. Then,foreachhistoryinfn−1 thatdoesnotstrictlyfollow
hn−1 n,t h ei m a g ei nfn is constructed (formally, hn−1 m is deﬁned for all m = 1     N,
but the particular assignment chosen is irrelevant if hn−1 n <h n−1 m). Inductively, this
ensuresthatthestructureofactionsandhistoriesinfn reﬂectsthatofthecorresponding
actions and histories in f = f0:
Lemma 2. For all   = 0     N, there are two conditions:
(i) For all n m ∈{       N}, h  n ≤H h  m if and only if h0 n ≤H h0 m.
(ii) For all n ∈{  +1     N}, there is a surjection α  n:f(h0 n) → f (h  n) such that, for
all a ∈ f(h0 n), h0 n =[ t ωn a0 n], h  n =[ t ωn a  n],a n dh0 m =[ t ωm a0 n ∪ a]
for some m ∈{ 1     n} imply h  m =[ t ωm a  n ∪α  n(a)].
Proof. The ﬁrst statement is obviously true for   = 0. Inductively, suppose it holds for
some  <Nand consider n m ≥   + 1. By the induction hypothesis, h  n ≤H h  m if and
only if h0 n ≤H h0 m;f u r t h e r m o r e ,b yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,h0  +1  <H h0 n and h0  +1  <H h0 m,s o
againbytheinductionhypothesis, h   +1  <H h  n andh   +1  <H h  m. ApplyLemma1(ii)
to conclude that h  n ≤H h  m if and only if h +1 n ≤H h +1 m; the assertion then follows.
The second claim is trivially true for   = 0. Inductively, suppose it holds for some
 <Nand consider n> +1 (if   = N −1, there is nothing to show). Since n>  , the in-
ductionhypothesisyieldsasurjection α  n:f(h0 n) → f (h  n)withthepropertiesstated414 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
in the lemma. By the choice of ordering on H0, h0  +1  <H h0 n; thus, by the ﬁrst claim,
h   +1  <H h  n. Moreover, by assumption, n  =   + 1,s oa l s oh   +1  =H h  n. Lemma 1(iii)
then yields a surjection α:f (h  n) → f +1(h +1 n) such that h  m =[ t ωm a  n ∪ a] im-
plies h +1 m =[ t ωm a +1 n ∪ α(a)].T h u s , ﬁ x a ∈ f(h0 n), h0 n =[ t ωn a0 n], h  n =
[t ωn a  n], h +1 n =[ t ωn a +1 n],a n dh0 m =[ t ωm a0 n ∪ a].T h e n h  m =[ t ωm 
a  n ∪α  n(a)] and, therefore, h +1 m =[ t ωm a +1 n ∪α(α  n(a))].T h u s ,α +1 n = α◦α  n
has the required properties; furthermore, it is onto, as are both α and α  n. 
Next, there is a unique ω∗ ∈  t ∩ Ft(ω) and, hence, a unique initial history in H0;
since this history necessarily precedes every other history consistent with f,i tm u s tb e
h0 N. Then, by construction, hn N = h0 N =[ t ω∗ ∅] is the only initial history in fn for
all n: in particular, this is true for n = N − 1,s oC P f(h0 N)hN−1 NfN−1 = CPf(h0 N), i.e.,
fN = CPf([t ω ∅]),t h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 8). Thus, to prove sufﬁciency, it is enough to
show that fn−1 ∼t ω fn for all n = 1     N.
Thus, consider n ∈{ 1     N}. By construction, the history hn−1 n is consistent with
fn−1 and intuitively corresponds to h0 n. I now show that, at every history hn−1 m that
immediately follows hn−1 n in fn−1, the continuation tree fn−1(hn−1 m) is CPf(h0 m).
Lemma 3. For every m ∈{ 1     n} such that h0 n <∗
H h0 m, fn−1(hn−1 m) = CPf(h0 m).
Proof.I tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tm<n . I claim that, for   = m + 1     n− 1 and for
k = 0      − 1, hk   and hk m are unordered, and, furthermore, hk k+1  <H hk   for   =
m     n−1.
Toseethis,considerﬁrstk = 0:f o r  = m+1     n−1,h0    <H h0 m,becauseh0 n <∗
H
h0 m by assumption. Furthermore, by construction, h0 m  ≤H h0  ,s oh0   and h0 m are
unordered. Finally, by construction, h0 1  <H h0   for   = m     n−1.
Inductively, assume the claim is true for k − 1 < − 1. By the inductive hypothesis,
hk−1 k  <H hk−1   for   = m     n− 1,a n dhk−1   and hk−1 m are unordered for   = m +
1     n− 1.B yLemma 1(ii), hk   and hk m are also unordered for   = m + 1     n− 1.
Moreover, since k< , k+1 ≤  ,s oh0 k+1  <H h0  ; the last part of the claim then follows
from Lemma 2.
The claim implies, in particular, that for   = m + 1     n− 1, h −1   and h −1 m are
unordered; Lemma 1(iii) now implies that f (h  m) = f −1(h −1 m) for such  . Therefore,
fn−1(hn−1 m) = fm(hm m) and the result follows from the construction of fm. 
Lemma 4. CP0
f(h0 n) is the next-period commitment version of fn−1(hn−1 n).
Proof.W r i t eh0 n =[ t ωn a0 n].C o n s i d e r b ∈ CP0
f(h0 n); by deﬁnition, there exists
a ∈ f(h0 n) such that, for every ω  ∈ Ft+|a0 n|(ωn), b(ω ) ={ a+1 ω } for some a+1 ω  ∈
CPf([t ω  a0 n ∪a]).
Now, for every ω  ∈ Ft+|a0 n|(ωn),l e tm(ω ) ∈{ 1     n} be such that h0 m(ω ) =H
[t ω  a0 n ∪ a].B y Lemma 2(ii), there is ¯ a ∈ fn−1(hn−1 n) such that hn−1 m(ω ) =
[t ωm(ω ) an−1 n ∪ ¯ a] for all ω  ∈ Ft+|a0 n|(ωn) = Ft+|an−1 n|(ωn).B y Lemma 3 and Re-
mark 3, fn−1(hn−1 m(ω )) = CPf(h0 m(ω )) = CPf([t ω  a0 n ∪ a]). Conclude that, forTheoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 415
every b ∈ CP0
f(h0 n),t h e r ee x i s t s¯ a ∈ fn−1(hn−1 n) such that, for all ω  ∈ Ft+|a0 n|(ωn),
there exists {a+1 ω}∈CPf([t ω  a0 n ∪a]) = CPf(h0 m) = fn−1(hn−1 m) = ¯ a(ω ) such that
b(ω ) ={ a+1 ω }:t h a t i s ,b is an element of the next-period commitment version of
fn−1(hn−1 n).
In the opposite direction, let b be an element of the next-period commitment ver-
sion of fn−1 n,s ot h e r ei s¯ a ∈ fn−1(hn−1 n) such that, for all ω  ∈ Ft+|an−1 n|(ωn),t h e r e
is a+1 ω  ∈ ¯ a(ω ) such that b(ω ) ={ a+1 ω }. As above, for every such ω ,l e tm(ω )
be such that hn−1 m =H [t ω  an−1 n ∪ ¯ a]. By measurability, ¯ a(ω ) = ¯ a(ωm(ω )),s ob y
Lemma 3, a+1 ω  ∈ CPf(h0 m(ω )); furthermore, by Lemma 2,t h e r ei sa ∈ f(h0 n) such
that αn−1 n(a) = ¯ a and h0 m(ω ) =[ t ωm(ω ) a0 n ∪ a]= H [t ω  a0 n ∪ a]. Hence, for every
ω  ∈ Ft+|a0 n|(ωn), b(ω ) ={ a+1 ω } for some {a+1 ω }∈CPf([t ω  a0 n ∪ a]=CPf(h0 m),
where the equality follows from Remark 3:t h u s ,b ∈ CP0
f(h0 n). 
The proof of sufﬁciency can now be completed. By Lemma 4,t h es e tC P 0
f(h0 n),
viewedasatree,isthenext-periodcommitmentversionoffn−1(hn−1 n),sob yAxiom 11,
fn−1 ∼t ω CP0
f(h0 n)hn−1 nfn−1.I fn o wn = N,t h e nhN−1 N is initial, so actually fN−1 ∼t ω
CP0
f(h0 n); furthermore, Axiom 12 implies that CP0
f(h0 n) ∼t ω {b ∈ CP0
f(h0 n):
∀a ∈ g {b} t ω {a}} = CPf(h0 N) = fN. If, instead, n<N,t h e nAxiom 10 implies that
CP0
f(h0 n)hn−1 nfn−1 ∼t ω CPf(h0 N)hn−1 nfn−1 = fn. Thus, in either case, fn−1 ∼t ω fn,a s
required.
For necessity, begin with a preliminary
Lemma 5. Consider a node (t ω∗) with t<T,at r e ef ∈ Ft(ω∗), and a nonterminal his-





{a}([t +|a| ω ∅]).
(ii) If g ∈ Ft+|a|(ω) is such that CPg([t +| a| ω ∅]) = CPf(h),t h e nCPghf([t ω ∅]) =
CPf([t ω ∅]).
Proof. Claim (i) holds because CP0
f(h) = CP0
f(h)([t +| a| ω ∅]) by Remark 2 and Deﬁ-
nition 5.
To prove the second claim, it is shown that, for any history h  =[ t ω  a ] consis-
tent with f and such that t +| a |∈{ t     t+| a|},C P f(h ) = CPghf(h |ghf).T h ec l a i mi s
obviously true for h  = h;a l s o ,i ft +| a |=t +| a| and h  = h , then neither h ≤H h  nor
h  ≤H h,s oLemma 1(iv) implies that f(h ) = (ghf)(h |ghf)and Remark 2 then implies
that CPf(h ) = CPghf(h |ghf).
Now consider h  =[ t ω  a ] such that t +| a | <t+| a| and assume that the claim
has been proved for all histories that immediately follow h .P i c kb ∈ CPf(h ) and let a ∈
f(h ) be such that, for all ω   ∈ Ft+|a |(ω ), b(ω  ) ={ a+1 ω  }⊂CPf([t ω   a  ∪ a]).W r i t e
h |ghf =[ t ω  b ]. Since h  ≤H h , Lemma 1 yields a surjection α:f(h ) → (ghf)(h |ghf)
such that, for all ω   ∈ Ft+|a |(ω ), [t ω   a  ∪ a]|ghf =[ t ω   b  ∪ α(a)]. The induction
hypothesis implies that for all such ω  ,C P f([t ω   a  ∪ a]) = CPghf([t ω   b  ∪ α(a)]).
Therefore, b ∈ CP0
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Conversely, if b ∈ CP0
ghf(h |ghf),t h e r ei s¯ a ∈ (ghf)(h |ghf) such that, for all ω   ∈
Ft+|a |(ω ), b(ω  ) ={ a+1 ω  }⊂CPghf([t ω   b ∪ ¯ a]).A g a i nb yLemma 1,t h e r ei sa ∈ f(h )
suchthat[t ω   b ∪ ¯ a]=[ t ω   a ∪a]|ghf forallsuchω   and,therefore,bytheinduction
hypothesis, CPghf([t ω   b  ∪ ¯ a]) = CPf([t ω   a  ∪a]). Therefore, b ∈ CP0
f(h ).
Thus, CP0
f(h ) = CP0
ghf(h |ghf), which implies that CPf(h ) = CPghf(h |ghf),a s
required. 
Now assume that Theorem 2(ii) holds. Since each t ω is complete and transitive on
F
p
t (ω),a n dC P f([t ω ∅)  = ∅ for all f ∈ Ft(ω), t ω is also complete and transitive on all
of Ft(ω). Next, the three axioms in Theorem 2(i) are considered in turn.
Axiom 10 (Sophistication).L e t f ∈ Ft(ω) and ﬁx a history h =[ t ω  a] consistent
with f that is neither initial nor terminal, and ﬁnally take g ⊂ f(h)as in the axiom. By
the ﬁrst claim in Lemma 5,C P 0
g([t +| a| ω  ∅]) ⊂ CP0
f(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]).N o wﬁ xbCP ∈
CPg([t +| a| ω  ∅]) and wCP ∈ CPf(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]). By the deﬁnition of consistent
planning and Lemma 5,t h e r ea r eb w ∈ f(h)such that b ∈ g, bCP ∈ CP0
{b}([t +|a| ω  ∅])
and wCP ∈ CP0
{w}([t +|a| ω  ∅]).
Suppose that w ∈ f(h)\ g: then, by the assumption in the axiom, {b}  t+|a| ω  {w},
and by Theorem 2(ii), {bCP}  t+|a| ω  {wCP}. But since bCP ∈ CP0
g([t +| a| ω  ∅]) ⊂
CP0
f(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]) and wCP ∈ CPf(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]), {wCP} t+|a| ω  {bCP},t h e r ei sa
contradiction.
It follows that w ∈ g.T h a t i s , f o r e v e r y wCP ∈ CPf(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]), wCP ∈
CP0
{w}([t +| a| ω  ∅]) ⊂ CP0
g([t +| a| ω  ∅]). Since, furthermore, wCP t+|a| ω  aCP for
all aCP ∈ CP0
f(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]), hence a fortiori for all aCP ∈ CP0
g([t +| a| ω  ∅]),
one can conclude that wCP ∈ CPg([t +| a| ω  ∅]); that is, CPf(h)([t +| a| ω  ∅]) ⊂
CPg([t +|a| ω  ∅]).
Conversely, if bCP ∈ CPg([t +|a| ω  ∅]),t h e nbCP ∈ CP0
f(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]) andthear-
gumentjustgivenimpliesthatalsobCP ∼t+|a| ω  wCP foranywCP ∈ CPf(h)([t+|a| ω  ∅]):
thus, it is also the case that CPg([t +|a| ω  ∅]) ⊂ CPf(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]).
Lemma5(ii) thenimpliesthat CPf([t ω ∅]) = CPghf([t ω ∅]), and thedeﬁnition of
t ω in Theorem 2(ii) then implies that f ∼t ω ghf, as required.
Axiom 11 (Weak commitment).L e t f ∈ Ft(ω) and ﬁx a history h =[ t ω  a] with
the properties indicated in the axiom. In particular, if a ∈ f(h), ω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω ),a n d
b+1 b 
+1 ∈ a(ω  ) = f([t ω   a ∪ a]),t h e n{b+1}∼ t+|a|+1 ω   {b 
+1};b yTheorem 2(ii), for all
a+1 ∈ CP{b+1}([t +| a|+1 ω   ∅]) and a 
+1 ∈ CP{b 

















Now let g be the next-period commitment version of f(h);Ic l a i mt h a tC P 0
f(h)([t +| a| 
ω  ∅]) = CP0
g([t +| a| ω  ∅]):b y Lemma 5(ii), this implies that CPf([t ω ∅]) =
CPghf([t ω ∅]) and hence, by Theorem 2(ii), f ∼t ω ghf, as required.
Fix a0 ∈ CP0
f(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]) and let a ∈ f(h)be such that, for every ω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω ),
a0(ω  ) ={ a+1 ω  } for some a+1 ω   ∈ CPf(h)([t +| a| ω   ∅ ∪ a]) = CPa(ω  )([t +| a|+1 Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) Dynamic choice under ambiguity 417
ω   ∅]). Then, by the above argument, a+1 ω   ∈ CP{b+1 ω  }([t +| a|+1 ω   ∅]) for
some b+1 ω   ∈ a(ω  ).N o w l e t b ∈ At+|a|(ω ) be such that, for all ω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω ),
b(ω  ) ={ b+1 ω  };t h e nb ∈ g and, furthermore, a0 satisﬁes the following property: for
every ω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω ), a0(ω  ) ={ a+1 ω  } for some a+1 ω   ∈ CPg([t +| a| ω   ∅ ∪ b]) =
CP{b+1 ω  }([t +| a|+1 ω   ∅]), where the equality follows from Remark 2 and the fact
that g([t +|a| ω   ∅∪b]) = b(ω  ) ={ b+1 ω  }. Therefore, a0 ∈ CP0
g([t +|a| ω  ∅]).
Conversely, suppose a0 ∈ CP0
g([t +| a| ω  ∅]),s ot h e r ei sb ∈ g such that, for ev-
ery ω   ∈ Ft+|a|(ω ), a0(ω  ) ={ a+1 ω  } for some a+1 ω   ∈ CPg([t +| a| ω   ∅ ∪ b]).B u t
by the deﬁnition of g,t h e r ei sa ∈ f(h) such that, for all such ω  , b(ω  ) ={ b+1 ω  }
for some b+1 ω   ∈ a(ω  ).H e n c e , C P g([t +| a| ω  ∅ ∪ b]) = CP{b+1 ω  }([t +| a|+1 
ω   ∅]) ⊂ CPa(ω  )([t +| a|+1 ω   ∅]) = CPf(h)([t +| a| ω   ∅ ∪ a]). It follows that a0 ∈
CPf(h)([t +|a| ω  ∅]),a sc l a i m e d .
Axiom 12 (Strategic rationality).L e t f and g be as in the axiom. Arguing as for
Axiom 10 (Sophistication), Lemma 5 implies that CP0
g([t ω ∅]) ⊂ CP0
f([t ω ∅]).F i x
bCP ∈ CPg([t ω ∅]) and wCP ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]). By the deﬁnition of consistent plan-
ning and Lemma 5,t h e r ea r eb w ∈ f such that b ∈ g, bCP ∈ CP0
{b}([t ω ∅]) and wCP ∈
CP0
{w}([t ω ∅]).
Suppose that w ∈ f \ g: then, by the assumption in the axiom, {b} t ω {w} and, by
the way t ω is deﬁned in Theorem 2(ii), {bCP} t ω {wCP}. Since bCP ∈ CP0
g([t ω ∅]) ⊂
CP0
f([t ω ∅]) and wCP ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]), {wCP} t ω  {bCP}:t h u s ,{wCP}∼ t ω {bCP}. If, in-
stead, w ∈ g,t h e nwCP ∈ CP0
g([t ω ∅]),s o{bCP} t ω {wCP}; but since {wCP} t ω {bCP}
as well, again {wCP}∼ t ω {bCP}. The deﬁnition of t ω in Theorem 2(ii) now implies that
f ∼t ω g, as required.
A.2.1 ProofofTheorem3 TheresultfollowsreadilyfromTheorems1and2,ex ceptthat
to show that (ii) implies (i), we must show that Theorem 3(ii) implies Theorem 2(ii). In
doing so, since  satisﬁes Axioms 7–9, Theorem 1 implies that (0
t ω) satisﬁes Axioms
3–6 and each relation is a weak order; we make use of this fact. Thus, assume that (ii)
holds, ﬁx a node (t ω), f ∈ Ft(ω),a n da ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]); we apply Deﬁnition 4 to show
that f ∼0
t ω {a}.
As in the proof of Theorem 1,t h e r ee x i s t sz ∈ X such that z ∼0
t ω {a}.F i x g ∈ F
p
0
and choose the unique sequence of t actions a in g such that h =[ 0 ω a] is a history
of g. Note thatfor any y ∈ X, Lemma5(i) implies that CP0
(f∪y)t ωg(h) = CP0




f([t ω ∅]), where we explicitly represent y as the plan f
y






({a}∪y)t ωg(h) = CP0
{a}∪y([t ω ∅]) ={ a a
y
t ω},b e c a u s e{a} is a plan. It is also
clear that CPy([t ω ∅]) = CPf
y
t ω([t ω ∅]) ={ a
y
t ω} and CP{a}([t ω ∅]) ={ a}.Iu s et h e s e
calculations below without explicit notice.
First, we claim that {a} 0
t ω|g f, using z as cutoff. If y   z,s oa l s oy  0
t ω z by Axiom 3,
by transitivity y ={ a
y
t ω}  0
t ω {a}∼ 0
t ω {a } for every a  ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]), and hence y  0
t ω
{a  } for every a   ∈ CP0




t ω([t ω ∅]).
Then, Lemma 5(ii) implies that CP(f∪y)t ωg([0 ω ∅]) = CPyt ωg([0 ω ∅]) and so, by The-
orem 3(ii), also (f ∪ y)t ωg ∼ yt ωg. If instead y ≺ z,t h e n{a}  0
t ω y;t h e nC P ({a}∪y)([t ω 418 Marciano Siniscalchi Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
∅]) ={ a}=CP{a}([t ω ∅]) and, therefore, CP({a}∪y)t ωg([0 ω ∅]) = CP{a}t ωg([0 ω ∅])
by Lemma 5(ii): thus, ({a}∪y)t ωg ∼{ a}t ωg.T h i sp r o v e st h ec l a i m .
Next, we claim that f 0
t ω|g {a}.I fy   z,t h e ny  0
t ω {a}.T h e nC P {a}∪y([t ω ∅]) =
{a
y
t ω}=CPy([t ω ∅]),a n ds o({a}∪y)t ωg ∼ yt ωg by Lemma 5(ii) and Theorem 3(ii). If,
instead, y ≺ z, then also {a}  0
t ω y and hence {a }  0
t ω y for all a  ∈ CPf([t ω ∅]).T h e n
CPf∪y([t ω ∅]) = CPf([t ω ∅]). Lemma 5(ii) now implies that CP(f∪y)t ωg([0 ω ∅]) =
CPft ωg([0 ω ∅]) and so (f ∪ y)t ωg ∼ ft ωg.T h u s ,f ∼0
t ω|g {a} for all g ∈ F
p
0 , which con-
cludes the proof.
A.3 Other results
Proof of Theorem 4. Recall that all relevant conditional preferences are well deﬁned.
Moreover, Axiom 13 holds if and only if for all nodes (t ω),p r i z e sx ∈ X,a n dp l a n s
p ∈ F
p
t (ω), p t ω x if and only if pt ωx  x. The “only if” direction is immediate; for the
converse, let p x h beasintheaxiom; byassumption p t ω x implies pt ωx  x andfor
all ω  / ∈ Ft(ω), p(ω )  x: thus, by monotonicity of MEU preferences, p  pt ωx  x.T h e
other cases are similar.
Now suppose (i) holds. This implies that Axiom A9 in Pires (2002) holds, and the
results therein imply that t ω is derived from  via prior-by-prior Bayesian updating.
Hence, CPMEU and CP coincide, and (ii) follows from Theorem 2.
Conversely, assume that (ii) holds. Consider a plan p ∈ F0
t (ω) and a prize x ∈ X
such that u(x) = minq∈C

t ωu(p(ω))q(dω|E); one such prize must exist because X
is connected and u is continuous. Now consider the tree (p ∪ x) ∈ Ft(ω); clearly,
CPMEU(p∪x)(∅) is precisely the set containing p and x; by (ii), we have p ∼t ω
(p ∪ x) ∼t ω x, i.e., p ∼t ω x.T h u s , t ω is consistent with MEU and prior-by-prior
Bayesian updating of C. This implies that CPMEU and CP coincide, so Theorem 2 en-
sures that each preference is complete and transitive, and that Axioms 10, 11,a n d12
hold. Finally, prior-by-prior updating implies that the above restatement of Axiom 13
holds. 
Proof of Proposition 2.B y Axiom 14,f o ra l l(t ω),a l lr s ∈ F
p
t (ω),a n da l lp ∈ F
p
0 ,
r ∼t ω s implies rt ωp ∼ (r ∪s)t ωp ∼ st ωp.T h u s ,b yAxiom 3,f o ra l lx y ∈ X and p ∈ F
p
0 ,
x ∼ y implies xt ωp ∼ yt ωp (for x = y, the claim is true by reﬂexivity), and since Ft(ω) is
strongly non-null, x   y implies xt ωp   yt ωp. By assumption, for all r ∈ F
p
t (ω) there is
x ∈ X such that x ∼t ω r and so also xt ωp ∼ rt ωp for all p ∈ F
p
0 .
Now suppose that for r s p,a n dq as in Postulate P2, it is the case that rt ωp  st ωp.
Let x y ∈ X be such that x ∼t ω r and y ∼t ω s.I f r ≺t ω s,t h e nx ≺ y and so rt ωp ∼
xt ωp ≺ yt ωp ∼ st ωp, which is a contradiction: thus, r t ω s. Therefore, x  y and so
also rt ωq ∼ xt ωq  yt ωq ∼ st ωq. Thus, P2holds; furthermore, thisargumentalsoshows
that the restriction of t ω to F
p
t (ω) is derived from  via Bayesian updating. 
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